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THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH*
Abstract
This article discusses a rare successful prosecution of a head of state by a
modern international criminal court. The case involved former Liberian president
Charles Taylor. Taylor, who was charged and tried by the United Nations-backed
Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL'), was convicted in April 2013 for planning
and aiding and abetting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious
international humanitarian law violations. He was sentenced to 50 years
imprisonment. The SCSL Appeals Chamber upheld the historic conviction and
sentence in September 2013. Taylor is currently serving his sentence in Great
Britain.
This article, from an insider who worked as an interim court-appointed defense
attorney during the opening of the trial in The Hague in June 2007, is the first to
comprehensively evaluate this significant international case since it concluded. I
expose the numerous controversies that dogged the trial of Liberia's former
president-from the questions that arose about how best to sequence peace for
Liberia andjustice for Sierra Leone following the prosecution's initial unveiling of
his judicially sealed indictment through to concerns about whether he should be
tried in the heart of Europe, as opposed to Africa, to the completion of appeals. I
conclude that the trial offormer President Taylor is significant for the SCSL because
he was the most powerful suspect to be indicted by the court. Although it may be
too early to draw definitive conclusions, a key lesson that we can derive for
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international criminal justice is that the indictment of a sitting president for
international crimes may sometimes help loosen his grip on power, thereby enabling
his subsequent prosecution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The trial of the former president of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor, by the
United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"), was remarkable
in at least four respects. First, it was the only case involving a non-Sierra Leonean
before the SCSL. All the other men prosecuted by the tribunal were Sierra Leoneans.
They were charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced for crimes that they planned and
committed against their own people in their own home country. Taylor, on the other
hand, was from neighboring Liberia where he is alleged to be responsible for even
worse crimes than those for which he was eventually charged in Sierra Leone. I But
Taylor, like all the other rebel leaders who participated in Liberia's dirty war, was
never prosecuted in his native country because the parties to that conflict effectively
granted themselves amnesty.2 Rather, he was implicated by the SCSL for supporting
Foday Sankoh, the leader of a rebel army called the Revolutionary United Front
("RUF"), to foment a war in Sierra Leone in which numerous serious atrocity crimes
were committed. Sankoh and Taylor allegedly made "common cause"3 to help each
other take over their respective countries for personal and political gain.
Second, as a criminal trial, the case against Taylor was inevitably complicated.
He reportedly never set foot in Sierra Leone during the time the offenses for which
he was charged were perpetrated.4 This meant that the prosecution's burden to prove
his case, when compared to the other SCSL cases, was going to be doubly difficult.
Indeed, for most of the pre-trial and trial phases, the success of the case against
Taylor appeared to hinge primarily on two expansive and controversial modes of
criminal liability in international criminal law-Joint Criminal Enterprise ("JCE")
1. 2 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, REPUBLIC OF LIBER., CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT
151-72 (2009) [hereinafter LIBERIAN TRC REPORT].
2. The Liberian TRC Report listed eight leaders of warring factions, two of whom have died, and
recommended that the living ones be prosecuted for committing atrocity crimes. Id. Taylor was at the
top of the list. But an institutional mechanism for prosecution, similar to the one for Sierra Leone, has
not to date been established in Liberia. Id. at 349. For an early scholarly work anticipating the need for
criminal accountability in Liberia for serious international crimes and a proposal for the expansion of the
SCSL's jurisdiction to cover international crimes committed there, see Chemor Jalloh & Alhagi Marong,
Ending Impunity: The Case for War Crimes Trials in Liberia, I AFR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 53, 70 (2005).
3. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 23, 25 (Special
Court for Sierra Leone May 18, 2012), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/6662-19559
[hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment]. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 -A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01 -A- 1389.pdf.
Commentary on the Taylor trial in respect of specific issues began following the trial judgment in both
the blogosphere and in academic journals. See, for examples of the latter, the thoughtful articles by Simon
Meisenberg, Laurel Baig, Kai Ambos, Ousman Njikam, Kirsten Keith and Kevin Jon Heller all of whom
participated in a special 2013 symposium issue on the Taylor Trial in the Journal of International
Criminal Justice (Vol. 11, Issue 4).
4. War Crimes Court Finds Charles Taylor Guilty, AIUAZEERA (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/201242693846498785.html.
5. For a critique of how the prosecution controversially pleaded JCE at the SCSL, see Wayne
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and command responsibility6-- neither of which requires the suspect to directly
commit the acts in question. The task for the tribunal's prosecutors was how, using
those two and other forms of criminal participation such as instigating or ordering,
they could link Taylor in Liberia to the offenses carried out by the RUF and its
collaborators on Sierra Leonean territory. Interestingly, although they managed to
secure Taylor's conviction for planning and aiding and abetting crimes in Sierra
Leone, the prosecution failed to prove JCE and command responsibility. The
inference could reasonably be drawn that the prosecutors over played the centrality
of his role in their narratives of the Sierra Leonean conflict.
Third, although Presidents Blaise Campaord (Burkina Faso) and (the now late)
Muammar Gaddafi (Libya) were apparently subjects of initial prosecutorial
investigative interest for training, arming, and otherwise financially supporting the
RUF,7 Taylor was the only sitting African president indicted by the SCSL (even
though he was no longer in power when he was actually arrested, prosecuted and
convicted).8 He was thus the first leader to be held criminally responsible for
international crimes committed in another African State.9 This later served as fuel
for his argument that his trial was political.'" Yet, the judges rejected his claim that
the prosecution selectively and vindictively prosecuted him based on improper
political motives and in order to simply advance the U.S. foreign policy interests in
Africa. They also rejected the contention that he was discriminatorily singled out for
prosecution, effectively painting his argument as an attempt to politicize his case
and to deflect his own responsibility."
Jordash & Scott Martin, How the Approach to JCE in Taylor and the R UF Case Undermined the Demands
ofJustice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY:
THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 96, 109-17 (Charles Chemor Jalloh ed.,
2014).
6. See Harmen van der Wilt, Command Responsibility in the Jungle: Some Reflections on the
Elements of Effective Command and Control, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY:
THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144-158 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed.,
2014) and Sandesh Sivakumaran, Command Responsibility in the Sierra Leonean Conflict, in THE SIERRA
LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 128-143 (Charles Chemor Jalloh ed., 2014). A provocative literary approach can be found in Ren6
Provost, Authority, Responsibility, and Witchcraft: From Tintin to the SCSL, in THE SIERRA LEONE
SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159-
180 (Charles Chemor Jalloh ed., 2014).
7. The Impact of Liberia's Election on West Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global
Human Rights & Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 150, 157 n.1 (2006)
(statement of David M. Crane, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone).
8. Crane has alleged that Gaddafi was an "unindicted co-conspirator" of Taylor's and that he did
not indict him and Campaor6 only because of evidentiary issues. On top of that, indicting two more West
African heads of state would have undermined the work of the Sierra Leone tribunal. The Prosecution
later revealed that, in fact, it had less than a tenth of the evidence it had against Taylor against Gaddafi
and Campaord-hardly the basis for a strong case. See id at 157 n. 11; Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note
3,1176.
9. The Taylor Trial, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html (last visited Mar. 1,2015).
10. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 11173-74.
11. Id. 1111l81-84.
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All others tried by the SCSL were leaders of rebel, militia, or other
organizations. But, the eight SCSL convicts drawn from the RUF, 2 the Civil
Defense Forces ("CDF"), 13 and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
("AFRC")I4 cases were part of the command structure of those entities. They each
either committed the crimes personally or were found to have exercised defacto or
dejure authority over the subordinates who perpetrated them. Thus, before Taylor's
arrest, the highest profile politician that the SCSL charged was the former deputy
defense minister, Sam Hinga Norman (who later died before judgment was
rendered).' 5 Taylor's head of state status and the fact that he had, by the time of his
indictment, gained notoriety for the abuses that his forces committed against
civilians in Liberia where he ascended to the presidency in August 1997,16 made him
the most "famous" person before the SCSL. As the perceived "godfather" of the
RUF, the stature of Taylor's case grew after Sankoh and his ruthless number two,
Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, died before they could be tried. ' 7 In other words, with
the apex of the rebel organization unavailable due to Sankoh and Bockarie's deaths,
Taylor became the last person standing. He inevitably gained in symbolic
importance as a figure-rightly or wrongly-the prosecution could exaggeratingly
blame most of the RUF depravations even though the Office of the Prosecutor was
12. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5892-5892; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Sentencing Judgment, (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5930-5930; Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/6098-6098.
13. Prosecutor v. Fofana, SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 11 1, 80-81 (Aug. 2, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4914-19301; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, 11 59-63 (Oct. 9, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5001-5001; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A,
Judgment, 8 (May 28, 2008), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5564-15137.
14. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 1 164-72 (June 20, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4852-1271 1; Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T,
Sentencing Judgment, 111 88, 108, 116, 135 (July 19, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4895-12838; Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A,
Judgment, 117-8 (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5315-14250.
15. Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Registrar's Submission of Evidence of
Death of Accused Samuel Hinga Norman and Consequential Issues, 13-18 (May 21, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4774-4774 (finding that the Court lost its jurisdiction over
Norman and that the case against him was legally extinguished or terminated upon his death). Norman's
trial was controversial amongst the SCSL judges as well elsewhere. See Lansana Gberie, The Civil
Defense Forces Trial: Limit to International Justice?, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS
LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 624-641 (Charles Chemor
Jalloh ed., 2014).
16. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 8.
17. Though Sankoh died in custody of natural causes on July 9, 2003, Bockarie was murdered,
allegedly on Taylor's orders on May 5, 2003. This led to the withdrawal of their SCSL indictments in
December 2003. Prosecutor v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8,
2003), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/1093-1093; Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-
2003-04-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/i094-
1094. See also Profile of Republic of Sierra Leone, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/sierraleone/82282.htm (last updated Mar. 2007).
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ultimately unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that-as William Schabas
aptly put it-Taylor was the "guiding spirit," "evil genius," or "mastermind" who
"manipulated the war throughout the 1990s."' I
Finally, in a still controversial decision that made his case even more unique
amongst the SCSL trials, Taylor was the only suspect tried in the heart of Europe at
The Hague in the Netherlands, away from the seat of the tribunal in Freetown, Sierra
Leone. 9 The decision to change the venue of his trial was taken ostensibly for
security reasons."0 Some critics, especially many from the local civil society,
including myself, vehemently contested this rationale.2 The critics argued that
Taylor-who was no longer in power-could not be a threat to an entire sub-region,
and that even if he was, it would have been far better, and certainly less costly, for
security to be bolstered in Sierra Leone and Liberia rather than move the SCSL's
most important case away from the alleged victim communities most affected by his
crimes." Similarly, Taylor was the only convict to be imprisoned outside Africa-
in the United Kingdom-where he is as of this writing serving a fifty-year
sentence.23 In contrast, all the others prosecuted by the SCSL for atrocity crimes
were detained in Rwanda.24 Taylor's repeated requests to be sent to Kigali or
somewhere else in Africa for family reasons, cultural affinity, and other similar
considerations have not gained any traction. For this reason, absent a fundamental
18. William A. Schabas, Charles Taylor Judgment Suggests a More Modest Level of Participation
in the Sierra Leone Conflict, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/20l2/04/charles-taylor-judgment-suggests-more.html.
19. See The Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor: Transfer of the Trial to The Hague, SPECIAL
COURT OF SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
20. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court President Requests Charles Taylor
be Tried in The Hague (Mar. 30, 2006) (on file with the Press and Public Affairs Office of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone).
21. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0 I-PT, Civil Society Amicus Curiae Brief
Regarding Change of Venue of Taylor Trial Back to Freetown, 1111 3-4, 13 (Mar. 9, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4652-4652.
22. See Taylor, SCSL-2003-0 I-PT, 1111 3-16 (pointing out correctly that Taylor had resided in
Nigeria freely, before his arrest and transfer to the SCSL, and that both the legislative and executive
branches of the Sierra Leonean government and civil society preferred his trial in Sierra Leone; further
highlighting that no public evidence had been produced to justify labelling him a threat to security in
West Africa).
23. See Charles C. Jalloh, Prosecutor v. Taylor Case Report, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 58 (2014).
Taylor's recent request to be moved from the United Kingdom to Rwanda was denied by the Residual
Special Court for Sierra Leone. See In the Matter of Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-
ES, Decision on Public with Public and Confidential Annexes Charles Ghankay Taylor's Motion for
Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/9091.
24. On October 31, 2009, all eight SCSL convicts were transferred to Mpanga Prison, just outside
Rwanda's capital Kigali, to serve their punishment. Since then, there have been several contempt cases
prosecuted by the SCSL. In the few instances resulting in convictions and jail time in the cases involving
witness tampering, the convicts have served their sentences in Sierra Leone. This explains the qualifier.
See generally, Press Release, Rwanda Ministry of Info., Sierra Leone Special Court Convicts Arrive in
Rwanda to Begin Prison Sentence (Oct. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.rscsl.org/Clippings/2009/2009-1 1 /pc2009-11-2.pdf.
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change of circumstances, he will most likely live the remainder of his natural life in
Britain.
This article examines the law and politics of the trial of former Liberian
president Charles Taylor. The paper is intended to introduce non-experts to the case
involving one of Africa's most notorious warlords and its controversies. Towards
that end, it aims to offer the first complete assessment of the trail of legal and
political controversies that came to characterize this high profile international trial
from the premature release of a sealed indictment for Taylor by SCSL prosecutors
in summer 2003 through to the disposition of final appeals in fall 2013, It exposes
and analyzes key legal, practical and other challenges that should offer lessons for
the prosecution of current or former heads of state in other international criminal
courts. Furthermore, because the article comes from an insider who was privileged
to work as court-appointed duty counsel during the opening of this fascinating case,
it is submitted that it makes an original and substantial contribution to the
international criminal law literature.
Although not without its difficulties, many of which will be discussed later on,
the Taylor trial was the jewel in the SCSL's crown. It is also one of the most
symbolically important cases in modem international criminal law. The reason is
simple. Prior post-Nuremberg attempts to prosecute heads of state or government
by the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
and Rwanda ("ICTR") and the permanent International Criminal Court ("ICC") have
implicated political figures of a similar standing. But almost all those trials have
been marred by practical issues, procedural irregularities, or other obstacles. Some
of the cases faltered because states lacked the political will to arrest the suspect (as
in the ICC indictment of President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan)25; or after entering into
a plea bargain with the ICTR prosecution, the accused tried to recant his guilty plea
(Rwandan Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda)26 ; or the defendant died before his
judgment was rendered (former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milo~evi6, at the
ICTY).27 In contrast, with the exception of a major hiccup at the beginning of his
trial and another which bookended its completion, the Taylor trial proceeded
smoothly. Today, despite the fact that each stage of his indictment, trial, and
conviction was marked by high legal and political drama, the Taylor case stands as
one of the better examples of a complex but successful trial of a former head of state
by a modem international criminal court. This underscores the wider significance
of the trial and makes it even more worthy of further inquiry by international
criminal lawyers.
25. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, Jj a-
c (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc I 759849.pdf.
26. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 11 34-46 (Sept.
4, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-23/trial-
judgements/en/980904.pdf; see also Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Judgment, 49-
95 (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-23/appeals-
chamber-judgements/en/0 01 9.pdf.
27. Press Release, Statement by the ICTY Prosecutor, The Hague (Mar. 11, 2006).
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The successful completion of the Taylor case is in many ways a credit to a range
of actors, who acted locally and globally: from the SCSL itself to the government
and people of Sierra Leone, and from foreign governments such as the United States
to the United Nations and local African and international civil society. The latter
became the champion of the victims of the Sierra Leone conflict, refusing to stand
by and let the Taylor trial be bargained away for reasons of political expediency, a
possibility that seemed real when he was offered asylum in Nigeria with the
blessings of African leaders and powerful western states in return for his resignation
from the presidency of Liberia.28 His trial is a testament to the potentially valuable
role that international criminal tribunals can make to the enhancement of regional
and global security, especially in the aftermath of horrific conflict and mass atrocity.
The article opens with a brief background into the origins and rise of Charles
Taylor in Part 11. Part III then discusses how Taylor got enmeshed in the Sierra
Leone conflict. This later led to his downfall, including his indictment, arrest, and
prosecution by the SCSL for the commission of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as
discussed in Parts IV, V and and VI. In Part VII, I conclude by summarizing my
key arguments and step back and reflect on the wider implications of his case for the
SCSL and international criminal justice more generally.
II. THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF CHARLES TAYLOR
Although he had briefly held a position as a senior government bureaucrat in
Liberia, hardly anyone outside Taylor's home country knew of him before 1989. He
was virtually unknown among the public in Sierra Leone. Yet, in the span of a few
years, his name was to be etched into the consciousness of all Sierra Leoneans as the
rebel leader from neighboring Liberia who threatened that "Sierra Leone would taste
the bitterness of war."29 In making good on that threat, he subsequently helped to
bring a vicious war to Sierra Leone. To Liberians, he moved from being a somewhat
known politically ambitious figure in exile to either a loved or hated rebel leader,
and eventually, democratically elected president.
Born in the small town of Arthington, Montserrado County, in northwestern
Liberia on January 28, 1948, Taylor by his own account came from a modest
background.30 He hailed from a large family, the third of eleven children, born to a
mother who was a former girl servant and a father who was a Baptist school
28. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 119.
29. See id. [ 2335 (Although Taylor denied making this infamous statement during his trial, the
Trial Chamber found otherwise. That this phrase, which is recalled by many Sierra Leoneans, captured
the national imagination is proved by the fact that it is usually repeated either verbatim or in essentially
the same formulation).
30. Id. 113.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
teacher.3 He began his early career following in the footsteps of his father as a
teacher.32 However, he quickly moved on to become an accountant.
33
He then pursued tertiary training at two small private colleges in Massachusetts,
United States, where he received an associate degree in accounting in 1974 and a
bachelor's degree in economics in 1976. 34 In the eight years between his arrival in
the United States in 1972 and his return to Liberia in 1980, Taylor and several of his
Liberian compatriots founded the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas
("ULAA").35 The apparent goal of the ULAA, which exists to this day, was to help
bring about peaceful and democratic change in Liberia.
36
Taylor's foray into helping create the ULAA while studying in the United
States appears to mark the beginning of his planned involvement with Liberian
politics. He assumed the ULAA chairmanship in 1979. 37 In that capacity, and at
the invitation of the government of President William Tolbert, he returned to Liberia
in January 1980.38 His arrival coincided with the successful coup d'6tat by Master
Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe just four months later. 39 Taylor joined the Doe
government as a Director General of the General Services Administration and
Deputy Minister of Commerce.
40
About three years later, he abandoned that junior cabinet position after the Doe
regime charged him with embezzlement. 4' He fled to the United States where he
was arrested in June 1984, following an extradition request by Liberian authorities. 42
He was held, pending return to his native country, until November 1985, when he
allegedly escaped from prison and returned to West Africa. 43 Taylor's version of
that account is that he was released from the Plymouth County House of Correction
by American officials. 44 They looked the other way while he left the country, via
Mexico, a story that initially appeared to be corroborated by documents obtained
under a freedom of information request by The Boston Globe newspaper but that
now seems to have been disavowed by the reporter who broke the story. 45 In any
31. Id.; Transcript of Record at 24357-59, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial (July 14,
2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Record-July 14, 2009], available at
http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/Charles Taylor/2009-07-14/21666.
32. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1J 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. 5.
36. Id. The ULAA website can be found here: http://ulaalib.org/.
37. Id.
38. See id. 1 6; Transcript of Record-July 14, 2009, supra note 31, at 24384-85.
39. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, Jill 6-7.
44. Transcript of Record at 24517-20, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial (July 15, 2009)
[hereinafter Transcript of Record-July 15, 2009], available at
http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/CharlesTaylor/2009-07-15.
45. Bryan Bender, Former Liberian Dictator Charles Taylor had US Spy Agency Ties, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/01/17/mass-escapee-tumed-liberian-
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event, it seems plausible that it was with the blessings of the U.S. government, which
was embarrassed by reports of corruption in Liberia and the Doe government's
flagrant violations of human rights, that he returned to West Africa to effect a regime
change.
46
Be that as it may, after leaving the United States, Taylor and several others
founded the National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL") in C6te d'lvoire. 47 The
NPFL took advantage of the mounting disaffection with the Doe dictatorship and
the Liberian government's ruthless crushing of the coup by Thomas Quiwonkpa to
attract many dissident fighters to its cause.48 The NPFL operatives subsequently
took up military training in Libya in 1987. 49 They thereafter returned to the sub-
region via Burkina Faso.5" With the launch of a military attack from the Ivorian side
of the border into the town of Butoa in Liberia on December 24, 1989, Taylor and
approximately one hundred "special forces," set off a civil war that would eventually
engulf Liberia and several countries in the Mano River basin of West Africa,
including Sierra Leone, Guinea, and C6te d'lvoire itself, which had served as the
launching pad for the initial NPFL incursion into Liberia. 51
Within a few months, Taylor and his fighters marched from the Liberia-C6te
d'Ivoire border to the capital Monrovia, recruiting many anti-Doe activists to the
NPFL.5  However, it was a splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic Front
of Liberia led by Prince Johnson, not the NPFL, which eventually caught and
savagely tortured and murdered Doe in early 1990.11 In the meantime, in the regions
of the country that the NPFL forces captured, Taylor and his followers established
the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly government.5 4 He served as head
of that government until 1996, when the first Liberian civil war ended with the
conclusion of the Abuja Accord in 1996, and democratic elections were
subsequently held. Taylor, running as the National Patriotic Party candidate in
July 1997, won the presidential elections reportedly with 75% of the vote and two-
thirds of the seats in the legislature. 56 The official vote count was never formally
released.
5 7
But Taylor's apparent electoral triumph and assumption of power in August
1997 did not restore peace to Liberia. Partly because of his policies, including his
failure to smoothly transition from rebel in the bush to chief of state occupying the
dictator-had-spy-agency-ties/DGBhSfjxPVrtoo4WT95bBl/story.html.
46. See Transcript of Record-July 15, 2009, supra note 44, at 24517-23.
47. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1117, 22.
48. LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 152.
49. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1I 7.
50. Transcript of Record at 24592-93, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01 -T, Trial (July 16, 2009),
available at http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/Charles Taylor/2009-07-16.
51. Id. at 24603-08.
52. LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 158.
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 157.
55. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 118.
56. LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 164.
57. Id.
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presidential Executive Mansion, Liberia foundered.58 According to the Liberian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the reality of his election as head of state did
not dawn early enough on Taylor for him to succeed.59 He carried on the usual
"antics" of a "warlord," adopting disastrous policies that antagonized key domestic,
regional and international constituencies.6" His "authoritarian" rule was marked by
"poor governance, administrative malfeasances, corruption, intimidation and
intolerance of opposition, threats, torture, terroristic acts," and routine extrajudicial
and summary executions.61 This would later give rise to Liberia's second war. The
conflict only ended after Taylor was forced to step aside, largely due to
developments in neighboring Sierra Leone.
III. THE FALL OF CHARLES TAYLOR
A. Sankoh, Taylor, and the Origins of the Sierra Leone Civil War
Ironically, Taylor did not fall from grace because of his war making in his
native Liberia. Instead, it was his meddling in Sierra Leonean affairs that ultimately
led to his downfall. That involvement originated from his association with RUF
Leader, Sankoh, whom he met in Libya. They agreed to help each other's projects
to take over Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively.62 Indeed, according to the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when Taylor's forces first invaded
Liberia in December 1989, the NPFL included many Sierra Leonean fighters in its
ranks.63 Sankoh, who was one of them, was a key commando. 6 He helped plan and
carry out attacks against strategic Liberian government military positions.6 ' He thus
put his Libyan guerilla training to use in anticipation of his war in Sierra Leone.66
He would bank on Taylor to return the favor just a few years later, and as a part of
this, shared with the NPFL a captured Armed Forces of Liberia military camp, Camp
Naama, to train around three hundred RUF fighters known as Vanguards.67 The
Vanguards later played a pivotal role in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Sam Bockarie,
Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao were Vanguards, all of whom-
along with Sankoh and Taylor-were later charged by the SCSL. 6 8
58. Id. at 164.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 167.
62. 3A WITNESS TO TRUTH: REP. OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N
97 (2004) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT].
63. Id. at 94-95.
64. Id. at 100.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 101.
67. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3; SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 101-02.
68. See The Prosecutor vs. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/RUF.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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Similarly, on March 23, 1991, a group of between forty and sixty fighters
attacked the remote village of Bomaru in the Kailahun District in eastern Sierra
Leone near the Liberian border. The bulk of the attackers were drawn from the
NPFL.69 Indeed, it was apparently a matter of frustration for Sankoh that, even after
grandly claiming responsibility for the Bomaru attack on the BBC Radio as the first
salvo of the RUF, which at that point had issued an ultimatum to then-Sierra Leonean
President, Joseph S. Momoh, to leave power or face a revolt, the government in
Freetown attributed responsibility for the invasion solely to Taylor and the NPFL. 7 0
The Momoh government, which had permitted the Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS") fighter jets to bomb NPFL positions in Liberia from
the Lungi International Airport near Freetown, the Sierra Leonean capital, ignored
the RUF for a long time before it formally recognized it as an independent force to
reckon with.7
To the Momoh government, the RUF was in effect the Sierra Leonean wing of
the NPFL.72 In retrospect, with the subsequent findings of the SCSL in its judgments
and the work of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian truth commissions, this might have
been an exaggeration. Nevertheless, throughout much of the Sierra Leone war,
Taylor and Sankoh rebels collaborated even if they had different agendas. For
Taylor, the military and political alliance with the RUF helped to not only achieve
tactical objectives such as fighting common enemies in Sierra Leone, including
dissident Liberian groups such as ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K that had organized
against him with the Momoh government's help,73 but it also enabled him to exploit
the country's diamonds for private accumulation.74 The RUF, which often captured
territory and mined diamonds with forced civilian labor, exchanged its precious
stones for arms primarily through Monrovia.75 Liberia, which was not a country
particularly well-known for diamonds, saw a remarkable increase in its official
diamond exports.76 Those exports might have since suffered a dramatic drop. In its
69. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, 1 112, 120-21; Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note
3, 1 2378 (concluding the "[t]he evidence unequivocally establishes that NPFL soldiers constituted the
large majority of the invasion force on Sierra Leone").
70. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1j 27.
71. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, 1140; see id. 1113. This seems to have justified,
in Taylor's mind, retaliation against Sierra Leone in addition to the fact that the government supported
and armed Liberian dissidents to form groups to fight against the NPFL. Id. 41,45.
72. See MICHAEL S. KARGBO, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE,
1991-2001, 20-21 (Peter Lang AG, Int'l Academic Publishers eds., 2006).
73. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1130-31, 33-34.
74. See JANNA LIPMAN, CHARLES TAYLOR'S CRIMINAL NETWORK: EXPLOITING DIAMONDS AND
CHILDREN, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, (Louise Shelley ed., 2009), available at
http://traccc.gmu.edu/pdfs/student research/Lipman PUBP 710 TOCTaylor/o27sDiamonds and C
hildrenFINAL.pdf. See generally Iryna Marchuk, Confronting Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone: The
Trial of Charles Taylor, 4 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 87, 87-89 (2009).
75. See IAN SMILLIE ET AL., THE HEART OF THE MATTER- SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY 6, 47 (Partnership Africa Canada ed., 2000). See generally U.N. S.C., Report of the Panel of
Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306, Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra
Leone, U.N. DOC. S/2000/1195 (Dec. 20, 2000).
76. SMILLIE, supra note 75, at 48. See also 3 Mersie Ejigu, Post Conflict Liberia: Environmental
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heyday, much of the profits from the lucrative diamond trade allegedly went to
Taylor. 77 By the time he became president, he extended his influence into several
areas of the Liberian private sector including exploitation of natural resources, such
as timber.78 By the end of the 1990s, Monrovia had become a haven for many other
illicit activities involving drug, gun, and diamond runners using the capital as their
home base.
79
During the early part of the Sierra Leone conflict, until the Liberian fighters
and the Sierra Leonean rebels fell out and turned on each other sometimes because
of sharp disagreements on the means and methods of warfare, the NPFL forces
reportedly carried out much of the atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone.8"
Indeed, it is estimated that up to 1,600 of the 2,000 fighters comprising the initial
invasion force from Liberia were NPFL rebels.8' Together with their RUF
collaborators and a smaller cadre of combatants from Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast,
and Gambia, they used tactics of terror and not only murdered and raped, but also
amputated civilians, including babies as young as six months old.82 With Taylor's
human, material, and other logistical support, and the successive Sierra Leonean
government's inept handling of the war, the rebels quickly captured much territory
in the two war fronts that they had opened in eastern and southern Sierra Leone.83
Soon, although their fortunes changed sometimes, the RUF had the upper hand.
The NPFL and RUF fighters also burned villages and looted property.8 4 The
catalogue of their hair-raising horrors included alleged acts of cannibalism,
decapitation of civilians, forced enlistment and drugging of children to fight, the use
Security as a Strategy for Sustainable Peace and Development, FESS WORKING PAPERS (2006),
available at http://www.fess-global.org/WorkingPapers/post conflict_liberia.pdf. See generally Report
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C. M.P. from David Pratt, M.P.,
Nepean-Carleton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis (Apr. 23, 1999).
77. SMILLIE, supra note 75, at 48.
78. GLOBAL WITNESS, TIMBER, TAYLOR, SOLDIER, SPY: How LIBERIA'S UNCONTROLLED
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION, CHARLES TAYLOR'S MANIPULATION AND THE RE-RECRUITMENT OF Ex-
COMBATANTS ARE THREATENING REGIONAL PEACE 6, 12 (June 2005) (submitted to the U.N. Security
Council), available at https://globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/TimberTaylorSoldierSpy.pdf.
79. Abdul Tejan-Cole, A Big Man in a Small Cell: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE 205, 209 ( Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds., 2009).
80. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, 11 239-42. See also Taylor Trial Judgment, supra
note 3, 1 32.
8 1. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 120.
82. Catherine E. Bolten, The Memories They Want. Autobiography in the Chaos of Sierra Leone,
44 ETHNOLOGIE FRANCAISE 429, 430 (2014), available at http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/EF-
published%20article.pdf.
83. See Chronology of Sierra Leone: How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL,
Apr. 1998, available at http://www.africa-confidential.com/special-
reportl/id/4/Chronologyof Sierra Leone.
84. Jamie O'Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support
Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207,
213 (2004).
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of human entrails at check points, and the slitting open of pregnant women to settle
bets on the sex of the fetus. 85
By the time the Sierra Leone conflict was formally declared over in January
2002, it was estimated that approximately 75,000 people had been killed, thousands
more victimized, and hundreds of thousands more displaced.86 Even the belated
comer to the Sierra Leone conflict, the U.N. Security Council, passed a Chapter VII
resolution deploring Liberia's active support of the RUF war.87 It determined that
Taylor's assistance to the RUF constituted a threat to international peace and
security and thereafter imposed sanctions on Liberia.
88
Following two successive coups in Freetown, first by the National Provisional
Ruling Council ("NPRC") in April 1992 under Captain Valentine Strasser, and later
by Lt.-Colonel Julius Maada Bio in 1996, a transitional democratic election was held
in Sierra Leone.89 The RUF was invited to participate but declined, preferring
instead to continue the war and to punish civilians through a savage amputation
campaign dubbed "Operation Stop Election."9 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a retired
Sierra Leonean bureaucrat from the United Nations who contested as the Sierra
Leone People's Party candidate, won.9' His main campaign promise was to end the
war, 92 music to the ears of the war weary population.
Kabbah immediately set about negotiations with the RUF. With the facilitation
of the Ivorian government, which played host to the first serious ceasefire talks
between the government and the rebels, he concluded the Abidjan Accord on
November 30, 1996. 93 The agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, granted
status of political movement to the RUF and its members and a limited amnesty
against prosecutions as well as foreshadowed the need for a national unity and
reconciliation commission.94 But even though some felt that this would mark the
85. Seeid at214.
86. J. Andrew Grant, Salone's Sorrow: The Ominous Legacy of Diamonds in Sierra Leone, in
RESOURCE POLITICS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 251, 252 (Matthias Basedau & Andreas Mehler eds.,
2005). Statistics are hard to come by, and of what there is, there is conflicting information. A leading
American human rights NGO has estimated the total number of deaths at 50,000 while the number of
displaced was put at I million. See Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone-Getting Away with Murder,
Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone, HRW Report, July 1999. A U.N. Report estimated
70,000. See also MARY KALDOR & JAMES VINCENT, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM EVALUATION OFFICE, CASE
STUDY: SIERRA LEONE: EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES
(2006). 1 opted for the 70,000 figure in the U.N. report in Charles C. Jalloh, Assessing the Legacy of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT
FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 1-19 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014).
87. S.C. Res. 1343, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (Mar. 7, 2001).
88. Id. paras. 5-6.
89. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, J 31, 39-40.
90. Id. 39.
91. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, at 40; see March 1996, SIERRA LEONE NEWS,
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews0396.html (last visited Mar. 1,2015).
92. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 40; see also March 1996, supra note 91.
93. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 40.
94. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, R.U.F.-S.L., art. 1, 13-14, Nov. 30, 1996, available at
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end of the war, that accord proved to be a ploy for Sankoh to regroup and rearm his
men who were, at the time, close to military defeat with the help of South African
mercenaries-as President Kabbah lamented much later. 95 The agreement collapsed
shortly thereafter. 96 The civil war resumed.
B. The AFRC Coup and the End of the Sierra Leone War
In the meantime, widespread dissatisfaction in Sierra Leone Army ("SLA")
ranks grew to a boiling point. President Kabbah had continued the prior NPRC
government establishment of local militias to provide security at the communal
level.97 This was prompted by doubts about the loyalty of some SLA forces, a
phenomenon that caused locals to label them sobels: soldiers by day, rebels by
night.98 The creation of a parallel militia implied a lack of trust in the army.
Consequently, on May 25, 1997, a group of mutineers overthrew the Kabbah
Government.99 A few days later, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
("AFRC") assumed power in Sierra Leone and invited the RUF to form a coalition
government.' 00 Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who was sprung from a notorious
national maximum-security prison where he was incarcerated, became president. 0"
Kabbah escaped to neighboring Guinea, where he set up a government in exile in
Conakry. 10 2  From there, he directed his deputy defense minister, Sam Hinga
Norman, to consolidate the different traditional hunters from various tribal groups
in Sierra Leone to form a civil defense militia. 103 Theirjob was to continue the fight
against the AFRC/RUF and to restore his government to power.' 
04
But the international community refused to recognize the illegal AFRC/RUF
regime. As part of this, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone in
October 1997."05 ECOWAS negotiated a six-month peace plan, aimed at the early
return of constitutional governance to Sierra Leone, which collapsed nearly
immediately.0 6 In early February 1998, working with the CDF militia, ECOMOG
http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
95. H.E. ALHAJ AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH, Two DECADES OF CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY IN
SIERRA LEONE: A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 3 (Institute for Security Studies ed., 2012), available at
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep201212Apr.pdf.
96. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 40.
97. Id. 142.
98. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 198.
99. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 42.
100. Id. 142-43.
101. 2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER, MUTILATION,
RAPE, NEW TESTIMONY FROM SIERRA LEONE 3(A), I1 (1999) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE: GETTING
AWAY WITH MURDER (1999)], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99-
02.htm#Pl42_28430.
102. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 248.
103. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 42; SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 248.
104. SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (1999), supra note 101.
105. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 44.
106. JULIUS MUTWOL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: INSURGENT
MOTIVATIONS, STATE RESPONSES, AND THIRD PARTY PEACEMAKING IN LIBERIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA
LEONE 252-53 (Cambria Press ed., 2009).
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forces expelled the junta from Freetown, 1°7 and on March 10, 1998, Kabbah was
reinstated. °8 The fighting continued. However, due to several peace initiatives and
the government's two-track political and military strategy to ending the war, peace
talks resumed in Togo in May 1999.9 A comprehensive peace agreement was
negotiated after several weeks. " 0 President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh signed it at
Lom6, Togo on July 7, 1999 ("Lomd Accord"), and although aspects of it discussed
further below proved to be controversial, it did provide a basic foundation for the
final end of the war.I I
The Lom Accord obliged the parties to an immediate ceasefire, provided for
the transformation of the RUF into a political party, and required the demobilization
of combatants." 2 There were also power-sharing provisions, including four senior
cabinet and fourjunior cabinet posts for the RUF, with Sankoh receiving the putative
position of vice president and chairman of the country's mineral resources
commission and others in the rebel organization appointed to the remaining
positions." 3  In lieu of prosecutions, the Lom6 Accord also mandated the
establishment of a truth commission for victims and perpetrators of human rights
violations to tell their stories.' " In probably the most derided provision, which
expanded the scope of a similar clause that first surfaced in the Abidjan Accord, the
agreement also granted a blanket amnesty to Sankoh personally and all other
combatants and their collaborators." 5  They were promised immunity from
prosecution for all their depraved actions throughout the war." 6 If this was the bitter
pill that had to be swallowed for the sake of peace, so be it, the Kabbah government's
logic went. It was a decision that, even after parts of the Lom6 Accord collapsed, the
president and his supporters continued to defend as necessary at the time. The
United Nations and several African and powerful Western States, including the
United States, endorsed the agreement.II
But, in a move that surprised participants, a last minute caveat was hastily
entered during the signing of the agreement by Ambassador Francis G. Okelo, the
U.N. special representative, at the talks. The United Nations, which was road testing
a new policy on amnesties, declared its understanding that no amnesty would apply
in respect of any international crimes committed during the conflict."' That
107. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 148.
108. Id.
109. SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (1999), supra note 101.
110. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, R.U.F.-S.L., July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter Lomd Peace Agreement].
Ill. id.
112. Id. arts. 1, 111, XV, XVI.
113. Id. art. V.
114. Id. art. VI.
115. Idart. IX.
116. Id.
117. Id. at Annex 1.
118. U.N. S.C., Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, para. 22, U.N. Doc. S/200/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). Many have described this statement as a
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decision, which effectively limited the amnesty to the domestic crimes committed
under Sierra Leonean law, would later prove to have been an important one. It
provided the foundation for the legal conclusion by the SCSL Appeals Chamber that
none of the accused persons before the tribunal in Freetown were entitled to any
form of immunity from prosecution because a State, such as Sierra Leone, could not
bring "into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international
law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and remember." 119
In May 2000, a renegade faction of the RUF operating in northern Sierra Leone
disarmed and held hostage around five hundred U.N. peacekeepers. 120 Several of
the peacekeepers were murdered.121 This angered many Sierra Leoneans, including
the Kabbah government, which saw it as a repudiation of core aspects of the Lom&
Accord. 12 2 Some civil society organizations and parliamentarians came together and
organized the largest rally in the country's history with over 100,000 participants. 1
2 3
They marched to Sankoh's residence to say enough was enough. 124 Everyone was
sick of the malevolent behavior of the RUF. In the chaos that followed after the
demonstrators arrived at Sankoh's house, in the posh West End of Freetown, some
shots were fired into the crowd, seemingly by the rebel leader's security detail. 125
Twenty-two unarmed protesters were killed while fifteen were wounded.
126
Government forces placed Sankoh under arrest.127 He was subsequently detained at
an undisclosed location.
C. The Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
With the combination of pressure for criminal prosecutions, coming from
human rights groups within and outside Sierra Leone, a fed-up Kabbah wrote a letter
to the United Nations in June 2000 requesting international help to establish an
independent special court to try the "RUF leadership" and their "accomplices" and
"reservation." But that may not be an accurate description as that term is understood in treaty law. The
United Nations was not a party to the treaty and was instead a witness and moral guarantor to it. See id.
23-34.
119. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, 67, 88 (Mar. 13, 2004). The Appeals Chamber position was
reiterated, inter alia, in Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. 14-AR72, Decision on Lack of
Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lom6 Accord (May 25, 2004). For thoughtful
commentary on the implications of these decisions, see Leila N. Sadat, The Lom Amnesty Decision of
the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT
FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 311-24 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014).
120. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 67.
121. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 358.
122. See Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Pres. His Excellency the President's Address to the Opening of the
Fourth Session of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone (June 16, 2000), available
at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-061600.html.
123. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 412.
124. Id.
125. Id. at435,437.
126. Id. at 435-36.
127. Id. at 444-46.
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"collaborators."' 128 The U.N. Security Council acceded to the request., 29 It thus
adopted Resolution 1593 asking the Secretary-General to negotiate a treaty with the
government of Sierra Leone to establish an independent tribunal to prosecute those
most responsible for the atrocities.' 
30
Following relatively smooth negotiations compared to the Cambodia Tribunal,
in January 2002,131 the United Nations and Sierra Leone signed the first bilateral
penal treaty' 32 between the United Nations and one of its member states to establish
an ad hoc tribunal. This treaty created a special court to prosecute those bearing
greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, specified in Articles 2 to 4 of the
Statute of the SCSL, and several offenses under Sierra Leonean law relating to abuse
of children and arson mentioned in Article 5.33 The Secretary-General described it
as a sui generis court with a mixed jurisdiction and composition.'34 The tribunal,
which was the first modem one to be based in the country where the crimes were
committed since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, was to be funded by donations,
last for three years, and began operations towards the end of 2002.135 It would go
on to prosecute several individuals, from the RUF, AFRC, and CDF warring factions
and, at the height of its operations, had two trial chambers and an appeals chamber
hearing several joint trials. 136 In a symbolic act, which seemed to advertently or
128. Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the U.N., Letter dated June 12, 2000 from the
Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786, Annex (Aug. 10, 2000).
129. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
130. Id. atJill 1,3.
131. Compare Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ICRC (Jan. 16, 2002),
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/605?OpenDocument, with Enemies of the People: Interview: David
Scheffer of Cambodia Tribunal; Monitor, PBS (July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.pbs.org/pov/enemies/khmer rouge tribunal update.php#.
132. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone,-on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter U.N. &
Sierra Leone Agreement]; see also Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
133. U.N. & Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 132, arts. 2-5.
134. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 19, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
135. See The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Its History and Jurisprudence, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
For more on the jurisdiction of the SCSL, see generally Charles C. Jalloh, Special Courtfor Sierra Leone:
Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 395 (2011). Discussion of the SCSL's deeply problematic
"greatest responsibility" personal jurisdiction can bc found in Charles C. Jalloh, Prosecuting Those
Bearing "Greatest Responsibility ": The Lessons of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 96 MARQ. L. REV.
863 (2013). As to the fascinating issues including the U.S. foreign policy stances that affected the
ultimate form the SCSL would take, see David J. Scheffer, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL
HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 296 (2012). For a wide comprehensive study of the tribunal's
legacy after completion of its work, see generally Charles C. Jalloh, ed., THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL
COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIM INAL LAW (2014).
136. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 516 (Goran Sluiteret al. eds.,
2013).
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
inadvertently underscore the importance of his trial, Taylor was the only accused
person that the SCSL tried alone. 13
7
IV. THE CONTROVERSIAL INDICTMENT AND ARREST OF CHARLES TAYLOR
A. SCSL Indicts Charles Taylor; Nigeria Offers Safe Haven
On March 7, 2003, at the SCSL prosecution's request, Judge Bankole
Thompson approved a seventeen count indictment against Taylor.138 The indictment
was accompanied by an arrest warrant and request for the suspect's arrest and
transfer. 3 9 The documents were placed under seal. On June 12, 2003, the chamber
formally granted a request unsealing them.14
0
The first indictment against Taylor charged him with individual criminal
responsibility pursuant to Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the SCSL Statute. 141 Under
Article 6(1), the prosecution alleged that Taylor, by his acts or omissions, planned,
instigated, ordered, committed, aided and abetted, or otherwise participated with
Sankoh in a common plan involving the crimes charged in eighteen counts. 142 In
addition to, or in the alternative, pursuant to Article 6(3), the prosecution claimed
that Taylor was criminally responsible as a superior for the crimes alleged in the
indictments. 143 The prosecution averred that he knew, or had reason to know, that
his subordinates in the RUF and the AFRC/RUF coalition were about to carry out
the crimes, or had done so, but that he failed to take the necessary measures to
prevent the acts or to punish the perpetrators.144
Taylor's indictment was amended twice, first on March 16, 2006, and again on
May 29, 2007.14 The final version on which he was tried contained a total of three
international crimes and eleven counts. 46 In five counts he was charged with crimes
137. Id.
138. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 1 32-59 (Mar. 7, 2003),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/003/SCSC-03-0l-1-001.pdf; Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-Disclosure (Mar. 7,
2003), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/003/SCSL-03-01-1-003.pdf.
139. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Order for the Disclosure of the Indictment,
the Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention and the Decision Approving the Indictment
and Order for Non-Disclosure (June 12, 2003),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/006/SCSL-03-0 1 -l-006.pdf.
140. Id.
141. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 6(1), (3).
142. Id. art. 6(l); Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 26.
143. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 6(3); Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 27.
144. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 27.
145. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Prosecution's Application to
Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment (Mar. 16, 2006),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/074/SCSL-03-0I-l-74.pdf, Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment
(May 25, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/255/SCSL-03-01 -PT-255.pdf.
146. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment
(May 29, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/255/SCSL-03-01-PT-263.pdf.
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against humanity, punishable under Article 2 of the SCSL Statute, namely: murder
(Count 2); rape (Count 4); sexual slavery (Count 5); other inhumane acts (Count 8);
and enslavement (Count 10). 14 7  Five other counts charged what are typically
referred to as war crimes, or in more technical jargon, violations of Common Article
3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which are punishable under
Article 3 of the SCSL Statute, 148 namely: acts of terrorism (Count 1); violence to
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder (Count
3); outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6); violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment (Count 7); and pillage
(Count 11). 14' Finally, the last count alleged his commission of other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, punishable under Article 4 of the
SCSL Statute, and in particular, conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in
hostilities (Count 9).15 None of the charged crimes involved any of the Sierra
Leonean offenses in Article 5 of the SCSL Statute.1
5 1
In terms of geographic and temporal scope, the prosecution alleged that the
crimes underlying the counts were committed between the beginning of the temporal
jurisdiction of the SCSL on November 30, 1996 and the end of the Sierra Leone
conflict on January 18, 2002.152 Yet, during the trial, the prosecution presented
much evidence that dated back to the period just before the beginning of the war in
March 1991. That material was not generally used when determining his individual
responsibility. The locations pleaded in the Indictment covered five of Sierra
Leone's largest districts from north to south and east to west, namely: Bombali,
Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Port Loko districts, the Western Area, as well as the
capital Freetown.' 53
147. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 2; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on
Prosecution's Application to Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-2003-01 -1, Decision on Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
148. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, art. 3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 3.
149. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Prosecution's Application to Amend
Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on
Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
150. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 4; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1. Decision on
Prosecution's Application to Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-2003-01 -I, Decision on Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
151. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Prosecution's Application to Amend
Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 -1, Decision on
Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
152. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment
(May 29, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/255/SCSL-03-01 -PT-263.pdf.
153. Id.
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B. The Question of Peace for Liberia versus Justice in Sierra Leone
Taylor's indictment was first made public by the SCSL prosecution on June 4,
2003.154 He had travelled to Accra, Ghana to attend peace talks that had been
convened in the hope of ending the brutal civil war prevailing in Liberia at the
time. 155 The SCSL prosecutor, David Crane, arranged for the indictment to be hand-
delivered to the Ghanaian High Commission in Freetown as well as transmitted
directly to the Foreign Ministry in Accra.' 56 Crane requested the Ghanaian
authorities to arrest Taylor and transfer him into the custody of the SCSL. 5 7 He also
issued a press release announcing the indictment.' 58
The publication of the Taylor indictment was a big surprise to Ghana, host of
the Liberian peace talks, as well as to the Government of Sierra Leone which had a
last minute warning of it when Crane gave a courtesy telephone call to the acting
president, Vice-President Solomon Berewa, who warned him that "it would be a
matter of indiscretion to serve the indictment on Charles Tylor at that summit
meeting, and such action would create huge embarrassment for President Kabbah
[who was attending the Accra meeting] and confusion in the entire meeting."'59 It
was considered a public embarrassment for the Ghanaian and other ECOWAS
governments which were not aware of it in advance. President John Kufour of
Ghana, the chair, felt betrayed by his international community partners for springing
a surprise on his government when negotiations had made great progress-
something that might have angered him even more given Berewa's disclosure that
"finding an exit strategy for Charles Taylor to vacate the Presidency of Liberia" was
even on the summit agenda. 6 Those delicate negotiations, which were taking place
154. Clarence Roy-Macaulay, Sierra Leone Court Indicts Liberia Leader, GUARDIAN (June 4,
2003), available at https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/29115.html (quoting
Prosecutor David Crane).
155. Abdoulaye W. Dukuld, West Africa: Taylor at Accra Peace Talks: "'Honourable Exit or
Extended Mandate?, " ALLAFRICA (June 4, 2003), http://allafrica.com/stories/200306040021.html.
156. James L. Miglin, From Immunity to Impunity: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 16 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 26 (2007).
157. See Davan Maharaji, Liberian President is Sought on War Crimes Indictment, L.A. TIMES, June
5, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/05/world/fg-indict5.
158. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone the Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of David
M. Crane Chief Prosecutor (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release of David M. Crane's Statement],
available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-060503.pdf. See also Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 -1, Order for the Disclosure of the Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest and
Order for Transfer and Detention and the Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-
Disclosure (June 12, 2003), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/006/SCSL-03-01-1-
006.pdf.
159. SOLOMON E. BEREWA, A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNANCE LEADERSHIP, CONFLICT AND
NATIONAL BUILDING IN SIERRA LEONE 181 (2011); PRISCILLA HAYNER, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN
LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 8 (2007), available at
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Liberia-Negotiating-Peace-2007-English 0.pdf; Kathy
Ward, Might vs. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 8
(2003).
160. BEREWA, supra note 159, at 182; Lansana Gberie, Jarlawah Tonpoh, Efam Dovi & Osei
Boateng, Charles Taylor: Why Me?, NEW AFRICAN MAGAZINE, May 2006, 4-5; Transcript of Record at
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as serious fighting occurred on the outskirts of Monrovia between Taylor forces and
other factions, were considered by many states as the best hope for the restoration
of peace to war torn Liberia.161
Not surprisingly, except perhaps to Crane, who seemingly made a calculated
decision to leak the indictment apparently even before securing a judicial order to
that effect, President Kufour refused to act on the warrant. 62 Instead, after some
initial confusion as to whether they had even received an official copy of the
indictment let alone had time to study or act on it, he gave Taylor his presidential
aircraft to fly him home to Liberia.163 The Accra Ceasefire Agreement was signed
by the Liberian Government and two other factions on June 17, 2 00 3 .64 For various
reasons, including the military and political pressure on Taylor and perhaps even the
indictment, he agreed to resign from the Presidency of Liberia several months later
on August 11, 2003.165 He took up residence in Nigeria, believing that by agreeing
to exit the political scene under African Union and ECOWAS led political
arrangements, he would be spared ultimate prosecution at the SCSL. 1
66
The political fallout from the indictment was immediate. Some diplomats
condemned Crane's actions as ill-timed and nat've, a form of obstructionism that
could stand in the way of peace in Liberia where a humanitarian catastrophe was
taking place and where Taylor was still an influential player.'6 7 The other side of
the story, from the SCSL side, was that justice had to be served on behalf of the
people of Sierra Leone. Interestingly, similar arguments about tribunal prosecutors
jeopardizing the prospects for peace among warring parties were to be echoed many
years later in the Uganda and Darfur situations after the ICC's first prosecutor, Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, secured arrest warrants for elusive Lord's Resistance Army rebel
leader Joseph Kony and Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. "6' Such claims have
since become integral features of the peace versus justice dilemma for international
criminal courts albeit on a different permutation typically focusing on the same
instead of two different countries. In any event, in each of the Uganda and Sudan
situations, but for the international warrants, the parties likely would have reached
agreement to end the bloodshed. That is how the argument is usually presented in a
curious counterfactual that is by its nature hard to debunk.
31505, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01 -T (Nov. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Record-Nov.
10, 2009], available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/Taylor/I ONovember2009.pdf.
161. See HAYNER, supra note 159, at 8.
162. Id.
163. Miglin, supra note 156, at 26-27.
164. Permanent Rep. of Ghana to the United Nations, Letter dated June 18, 2003 from the Permanent
Rep. of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2003/657 (June 18, 2003).
165. The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed just days later, on August 18, 2003,
bringing an end to Liberia's 15 year civil war. See LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 169.
166. Transcript of Record-Nov. 10, 2009, supra note 160, at 31529-30.
167. See HAYNER, supra note 159, at 9-10.
168. See Charles C. Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT'L. CRIM. L. REV.
(2009) 445,489491 (discussing the criticisms of the ICC in the Uganda Situation).
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Taylor, for his part, apparently agreed to resign so that a final Liberia peace
agreement could be concluded. He also played an important role during the RUF-
Kabbah negotiations of the Lomd Accord in the summer of 1999. The record is
unclear as to whether he agreed to resign Liberia's presidency before he was indicted
in Sierra Leone or afterwards. If the former, which can be supported by Vice-
President Berewa's contention that the issue of Taylor's exit was already on the
ECOWAS heads of states' agenda, the concern about the effect of unveiling an
indictment on a prospective prosecution would obviously be higher. It may perhaps
suggest that a promise of non-prosecution was used as a carrot. On the other hand,
if he agreed after the indictment was unveiled, it could suggest that the stick of
prosecution could be used to hasten the departure of a recalcitrant leader who could
otherwise jeopardize the chances of long-term peace.
Whatever the case, as Taylor dilly-dallied from resigning in the wake of the
publication of his sealed indictment, thousands more were killed near Monrovia. 169
He was probably seeking to stay on until he could secure the guarantees he felt were
necessary to secure his position, which according to him, was a promise that he
would not be prosecuted by the SCSL. 7 ° He would later testify during his trial that
had he known he would be apprehended and sent to the tribunal in Freetown,
contrary to the political deal sanctioned by African and powerful Western States that
his indictment would become "moot," he would not have resigned from Liberia's
presidency.' 7 ' He would have fought to the end. Although we will never know if
this would have actually happened, taking Taylor's statement at face value raises
some valid concern whether future rebels might refuse to sign agreements to make
way for peace because of the Taylor precedent. If so, even though each conflict
situation will probably be different in its own way and will have to be assessed in
light of its specificities, the implications for short term peace may prove to be dire.
The reality is that a political settlement, amongst warring adversaries, is often the
only real option for a final termination of bloody rebel-led conflicts in which neither
side is positioned to claim clear military victory.
On the other hand, much like the ICC prosecutor would later respond to those
who advanced the peace-justice argument after indictments for persons in Uganda
and the Sudan, Crane retorted that he had both the legal and moral obligation to
follow evidence of international crimes falling within his jurisdiction.172 To him,
with the indictment in place, it was important that anyone negotiating with Taylor
know his status as an alleged war criminal. This was obviously calculated to weaken
Taylor's bargaining position and to perhaps even render his relevance to a final
political settlement nugatory. Furthermore, in another point that was later echoed
by the ICC prosecutor, the SCSL prosecutor insisted that he could only fulfill his
responsibilities if the international community showed the political will necessary
169. Mutuma Ruteere, Liberia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press ed.,
2009).
170. Charles C. Jalloh, Charles Taylor and the Delayed Special Court for Sierra Leone Judgment,
JURIST (Feb. 23, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/charles-jalloh-taylor-scsl.php.
171. Transcript of Record-Nov. 10, 2009, supra note 160, at 31503.
172. Press Release of David M. Crane's Statement, supra note 158.
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to carryout arrests requested by the tribunal rather than giving "weak excuses." 173
He therefore urged all supporters of the SCSL to not further disappoint the people
of Sierra Leone.' 7
4
Crane seemed well-meaning and within his mandate as a prosecutor. However,
in retrospect, it appears that he went about the revelation of the Taylor indictment in
a way that rubbed many key states, especially crucial African partners, the wrong
way. He might have miscalculated the full diplomatic implications and the political
backlash that the announcement of the indictment would entail. Maybe, like
Ocampo's move much later on against President Al Bashir at the ICC, Crane felt
that the political tide had turned against Taylor, making it easy to secure his arrest.
If that was so, this proved to be a wrong assessment.
With hindsight, a more cautious rather than messianic approach would have
likely yielded faster results to get the concerned African states behind the idea of
arresting Taylor. Many of those same countries were already sick of Taylor's wars.
These included Nigeria, the regional superpower, which had expended much
political and military resources in an attempt to restore peace first to Liberia and
then Sierra Leone.'75 Privately, if not publicly, many of them would probably have
welcomed the chance to help apprehend and turn him over to the SCSL to answer
international crimes charges. Whatever the case, it seems that the SCSL indictment
helped to fast-track Taylor's political demise. It apparently served as a credible
threat to the alternative of his continuing a war he was not equipped to win against
insurgents in Liberia. The ICC prosecutor could have learned from the SCSL's
initial mishandling of the Taylor arrest warrant regarding how to avoid antagonizing
the African Union member states ("AU states") that were more likely to help him
secure Al Bashir's arrest. 7 6 To date, nearly six years after Al Bashir's indictment,
AU states have decided that none of them would arrest him and thereby refused to
turn him over to the ICC. "I Even though there is a legal obligation to do so under
the Rome Statute and in light of the decisions of the judges on the point, the
unfortunate effect has been that-at least for now-Al Bashir can call the Court's
bluff. This seems to be an example of how the ICC prosecution is reinventing the
173. Id.
174. Id
175. See LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv.
176. The Liberian TRC Report has argued that Crane's indictment of Taylor had the effect of
excluding him from the peace negotiations. See LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 169.
177. AU Chief Condemns Bashir Warrants, ALJAZEERA (July 27, 2010),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/2010726423699861.html. For scholarly assessments of
the Africa-ICC tension, including a discussion of the Al Bashir arrest controversy from multiple
perspectives, see Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, supra note 168; Charles C. Jalloh,
Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? Assessing the African Union Perspective on Universal
Jurisdiction, 21 CRIM. L. FORUM. 1 (2010). See also Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council
Referrals to the ICC and the Impact on Al Bashir's Immunities, 7 J. OF INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 333-352 (2009);
Dire Tladi, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of
International Law 34 SOUTH AFRICAN YRBK OF INT'L. L. 57 (2009); Dire Tladi, Cooperation, Immunities
and Article 98 of the Rome Statute: Confronting the Complexities of Interpretation, 11 J. OF INT'L. CRIM.
JUST. 199 (2013).
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wheel rather than learning from the rich experiences of the ad hoc tribunals that
preceded it.
C. Nigeria Asylum Unravels, the Noose Tightens Around Taylor, and the
Dramatic Arrest
The immediate impact of Crane's attempt to cajole or shame Ghana into
arresting Taylor was to delay instead of hastening his arrest. It would take another
three years, much diplomatic and other advocacy efforts, as well as changed
circumstances in Liberia, West Africa, and in U.S. foreign policy under the Bush
Administration before Nigeria would eventually surrender Taylor to the SCSL at the
end of March 2006.178 To be sure, amongst Sierra Leonean civil society, especially
war victim groups, there was popular support for Taylor's arrest. Similarly, in
Nigeria, Taylor's stay at a government-furnished mansion in the southern city of
Calabar became controversial, especially after a case was initiated in the local High
Court by two Nigerian businessmen who had been amputated by RUF forces in
Sierra Leone. 179 They argued that Nigeria could not harbor Taylor by granting him
asylum, and that by doing so instead of prosecuting or extraditing him to the SCSL
to face charges, their rights under the Nigerian Constitution and international law
had been violated. 8 ' Various local and international human rights groups intervened
in support.' 8' The court agreed to hear the matter and the government appealed.'82
Meanwhile, within some government circles in the ECOWAS region, political
pressure for Taylor's arrest slowly began to gain some momentum. 183 As one of the
conditions of Taylor's asylum in Nigeria, he agreed to stay out of Liberian
politics.8 4 But, by around the middle to late 2005, claims had emerged that he was
still seeking to meddle in politics not only in Liberia but in other countries in the
178. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone the Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Special
Court Prosecutor Desmond de Silva, QC Welcoming the Nigerian Announcement of the Transfer of
Charles Taylor (Mar. 25, 2006), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-
032506.pdf.
179. See Babatunde Fagbohunlu, Challenging Taylor's Asylum in Nigeria, in INT'L JUST. AND
TRANSNAT'L REMEDIES 62, 64 n.1, (Open Society Foundation 2005) (stating "Suit No
FHC/ABJ/M/216/04 and Suit No FHCABJ/A/217/04 commenced by way of Originating Summons filed
by David Anyaele and Emmanuel Egbuna against Charles Taylor, the Federal Commissioner for
Refugees, the Eligibility Committee for Refugees, the National Commission for Refugees, the President
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the Attomey-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria."),
available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/fagbohunlu.pdf.
180. Id. at 63.
181. Id. at 62.
182. ld at 63.
183. See Liberia: West African Leaders Callfor Review of Taylor's Asylum Deal, IRIN NEWS (Aug.
1, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=55662.
184. Craig Timberg, A Warlord's Exile Divides His Hosts: Liberian Ex-President Charles Taylor
Doing Business as Usual in Nigeria, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/08AR2005100 801243_pf.html; Douglas Farah, A Protected Friend of
Terrorism, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/04/24/AR2005042400893.html.
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West Africa sub-region.'85 This included Cote D'Ivoire where, though this was
never proved, he was even alleged to have backed a coup plot.'86 The SCSL
Prosecutor later tried to link his activities to those of Al Qaeda, another assertion
that was never substantiated publicly.
Further afield, in Europe and the United States, various resolutions were passed
by Parliament and Congress respectively.'87 A prelude to this turn of events was
that, in late 2003, the United States announced a $2 million reward for information
leading to Taylor's capture.' 88 This was part of the Rewards for Justice Program,1
89
which the United States had been operating to encourage arrests of fugitives wanted
by ad hoc tribunals. But public announcement of the decision to include the SCSL's
star indictee in the mix was not backed with a serious diplomatic push for his
apprehension. It would take another two years, until the passage of the resolution in
Europe in February 2005'90 that similarly supportive action was taken by the British
parliament.191 All these resolutions urged the Nigerian authorities to send Taylor to
the SCSL. Still, despite their apparent political weight, the Bush Administration did
not say much until around January 2006, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice announced that the United States was keen to see Taylor transferred to the
SCSL. 192
At the level of the U.N. Security Council, which has the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, a travel ban had been placed
on Taylor and his senior associates by March 2001. 9 They had repeatedly and
flagrantly violated U.N. sanctions, including the illegal supply of arms, ammunition,
and other logistical and communications equipment to the RUF in Sierra Leone. 1
94
By the end of November 2005, the Security Council was ready to take a further step
by which it authorized U.N. peacekeepers to apprehend Taylor in the event he was
to return to Liberia. 95 The peacekeepers were to transfer him to the SCSL. 196 This
confounded Taylor, who wondered how he could be arrested when he was not even
185. Timberg, supra note 184; Farah, supra note 184.
186. Timberg, supra note 184.
187. Resolution on the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Case of Charles Taylor, EUR. PAR. DOc.
P6 TA (2005)0059 (2005); H.R. Con. Res. 127, 109th Cong. (2005).
188. In $87.5 Billion Bill, $2 Million Bounty for Exiled Liberian, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/1 1/10/world/in-87.5 -billion-bill-2-million-bounty-for-exiled-
liberian.html.
189. REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, http://www.rewardsforjustice.net (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
190. Resolution on the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Case of Charles Taylor, supra note 187.
191. U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone, EARLY DAY MOTION 1375, H.C. (June 10, 2003),
available at http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2002-03/1375.
192. Felix Onuah, Wanted Liberian Warlord Disappears in Nigeria, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/28/AR2006032800390_pf.html.
193. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1343, para. 7(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 343 (Mar. 7, 2001).
194. Id. para. 2(b).
195. U.N. S.C. Res. 1638, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 638 (Nov. 11, 2005).
196. Id.; For commentary, see generally Micaela Frulli, A Turning Point in International Efforts to
Apprehend War Criminals: The U.N. Mandates Taylor's Arrest in Liberia, 4 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 351-
61 (2006).
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in Liberia. But, in retrospect, he realized it meant that the groundwork was being
laid.
The Nigerian government under President Olesugun Obasanjo, which had
initially insisted that it would not turn over Taylor to the SCSL (because it did not
want to be seen as reneging on an African Union and ECOWAS agreement to keep
Taylor), announced that it would honor a democratically-elected Liberian
government's request for it to do so. 197 This opened the door for a potential transfer.
The momentum for Taylor's arrest seemed inexorable. The time was coming. In
the meantime, Liberia held transitional elections as per the Accra Peace Accord.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won the vote, becoming Africa's first female head of state. 98
On March 5, 2006, the new Liberian president, in a not entirely selfless decision
given her initial support to Taylor for the establishment of the NPFL, requested the
Nigerian authorities to turn over Taylor to her government. 99 She did so reportedly
because of unrelenting pressure from several of Liberia's crucial development
partners, including the United Nations, the United States, and the European
Union.20  On March 25, 2006, President Obasanjo informed Johnson Sirleaf that
Liberia was "free to take former President Charles Taylor into its custody,"'2 1 but
by not arresting Taylor, Nigeria raised questions about whether it was still seeking
to shield the suspect.
The final act in the Taylor arrest drama was Obasanjo's visit to Washington.
He was scheduled to meet with President George Bush at the White House on March
29, 2006.202 Just a couple of days before, on March 27, Nigeria, in an apparent face
saving ploy, had announced that Taylor had suddenly "escaped" from his villa in
Calabar.2 3 The United States warned of "consequences" if Taylor was not turned
over.2' The day before the White House meeting, it was made abundantly clear that
Bush would cancel the meeting with Obasanjo if the Taylor issue was not
resolved.2 5 Abuja, which had expressed dismay at the "persistent pressure" it was
receiving "to violate the understanding of 2003," reversed course. 2 06 Only hours
197. Onuah, supra note 192.
198. Ernest Harsch, Liberian Woman Breaks the 'Glass Ceiling,' AFRICA RENEWAL (Jan. 2006),
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/j anuary-2006/liberian-woman-breaks-%E2%80%98glass-
ceiling%E2%80%99.
199. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Liberia: President Requests Surrender of Taylor (Mar.
17, 2006).
200. Johnson-Sirleaf Describes Attempts to Come to Terms with Liberia's Violent Past, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa-jan-juneO6-liberia 3-23/.
201. See Statement by the Federal Government of Nigeria-Former President Charles Taylor to the
transferred to the custody of the Government of Liberia, Mar. 25, 2006. See also Bernard Hibbitts,
Nigeria to Hand over War Crimes Indictee Taylor to Liberia, JURIST (Mar. 25, 2006),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2006/03/breaking-news-nigeria-to-hand-over-war.php.
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later, on March 29, Nigerian forces "found" Taylor at a remote border post close to
Cameroon. 207 He was arrested with sacks of money ($50,000), allegedly given to
him by Obasanjo, and immediately put under guard in a military jet and flown to
Monrovia. 21 0 Obasanjo met with Bush while Taylor was on his way to Liberia,
where he was arrested, upon arrival, by U.N. peacekeepers on the tarmac at
Monrovia's Robertsfield International Airport and transferred onto a U.N.
helicopter.209 He was flown to the SCSL premises at New England in Freetown.
21 1
Nearly the whole of Sierra Leone celebrated.
211
The prosecution was anxious to have Taylor arraigned. Taylor was not in a
rush. He had arrived with only the clothes on his back, so he insisted to the Defense
Office that his clothing be brought in from Nigeria.212 That was duly brought, at his
own expense, by one of his former chiefs of protocol who flew on the earliest
available flight.2" 3
On April 3, 2006, a date negotiated between the Defense Office and the Office
of the Prosecutor, a still visibly shaken Taylor was arraigned before Presiding Judge
Richard Lussick of Trial Chamber 1I and read out his charges.214 He pleaded "most
definitely.., not guilty."215 In later trial testimony, he would invite Obasanjo to tell
the truth about his so-called escape.216 He then explained that he had effectively
been duped by an African "brother." 217 Taylor, pressed as to reasons why, then
suggested that Nigeria might have given him up because of its hope to secure a
permanent seat on the Security Council, which was being discussed at the time, and
Obasanjo's desire to run for a third term in office without U.S. opposition. 218
V. CONTROVERSIAL PRELIMINARY ISSUES BEFORE THE CHARLES TAYLOR TRIAL
A. Taylor Claims Immunity from Prosecution
In the Taylor case, unlike most other international criminal trials, some of the
preliminary legal issues were raised before he was even arrested. The first of these
occurred when, as President of Liberia, he hired a Sierra Leonean lawyer, Terence
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artice/2006/03/26/AR2006032600 928 .html.
207. Amin George Forji, Nigerian Police Arrest Fugitive Liberian Warlord, OHMYNEWS (Mar. 30,
2006),
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article-view.asp?article class-3&no=282501 &relno=I.
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209. Id. at31522.
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213. See generally id.
214. Personal observation of this author, who was present in the courtroom, during Taylor's
arraignment. See also Transcript of Record at 4-13, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 -T (Apr.
3, 2006), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/Taylor/3April2006.pdf.
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218. Id. at 31520.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Terry, to seek a quashing of the SCSL indictment.219 This was done even as Liberia
also planned, ultimately unsuccessfully, to pursue the arguably better alternative of
initiating legal proceedings against Sierra Leone at the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").220 The essence of Liberia's claim was that the SCSL's issuance of an
international arrest warrant against Taylor violated a fundamental rule of
international law which provided for Taylor's immunity, as a head of state, from
criminal proceedings in foreign criminal jurisdictions.22 1 Sierra Leone had also
violated the rule prohibiting it from exercising judicial power on the territory of
another state, in as much as Liberia was not a party to the United Nations-Sierra
Leone Agreement establishing the SCSL.222 As the tribunal was not a U.N. organ,
and also not an established international penal court, it could not impose legal
obligations on a third state like Liberia.223 But that process did not go far because
Sierra Leone's consent was required for the ICJ to have jurisdiction and was not
given.
224
On July 23, 2003, at the SCSL itself, Terry filed a motion submitting that
Taylor, who was a sitting head of state at the time the alleged crimes were
committed, was absolutely immune from any exercise of jurisdiction by the
SCSL.225 He relied on the ICJ ruling in the Congo v. Belgium (Arrest Warrant) case
to argue that the indictment was invalid under international law. 226 In that dispute,
the World Court had decided the question whether Belgium, by merely issuing and
circulating an arrest warrant for the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Abdoulaye Yerodia, had violated customary international law.227  Although the
Court determined that, due to the principle of sovereign equality, foreign ministers
and other high ranking officials such as heads of state were shielded from
prosecution before the national courts of other states, it identified four exceptions
under which such exercise of jurisdiction would be permissible. 22 As part of this,
219. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, at
3015 (May 31, 2004), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Taylor.pdf.
220. Id. at 3016. See also Charles C. Jalloh, Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes:
The Case of Charles Taylor at the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 8 ASIL INSIGHTS 9 (2004), available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/2 1/immunity-prosecution-international-crimes-case-
charles-taylor-special.
221. Immunityfrum Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor at the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 220.
222. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, at 3018, 3039.
223. Id. at 3039.
224. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to the International Court of Justice in a
Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning an International Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone Against the Liberian President (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr = 1027&pt-&pl =6&p2= 1.
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the ICJ determined that an incumbent foreign minister or head of state may be
subject to prosecution before certain international penal courts, where such courts
possess jurisdiction.229 It cited as examples of this the ICTY and ICTR as well as
(at the time) the future ICC.23° Taylor's attorney submitted that because the SCSL
lacked the Chapter VII powers of the ICTY and ICTR, it was more akin to a national
court of Sierra Leone, and consequently, that it lacked jurisdiction over Taylor.23'
In resolving the preliminary motion, which was forwarded to the Appeals
Chamber, two questions were central: firstly, whether Taylor, who was at the time
of the decision no longer holding office as president, was entitled to immunity from
the legal processes of the SCSL; and secondly, whether the SCSL was a national or
international criminal tribunal. 232  The prosecution made both procedural and
substantive arguments. 233 It suggested, with regards to the former, that it was wrong
for Taylor to challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction before personally submitting to
it.234 On the merits, the prosecution argued that the SCSL, which was not part of the
Sierra Leonean judiciary and was created as an independent tribunal under
international law, could not be subject to the same limitations as the ICJ had found
applicable to the national courts of states such as Belgium. 235
In its decision on the motion, which has been controversial among
commentators since it was handed down, the Appeals Chamber denied the defense
motion. 236 It examined the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal precedents, as well as the
rulings in the Arrest Warrant and Pinochet cases, alongside the briefs filed by
Amicus Curiae Phillip Sands and Diane Orentlicher. 237 It then concluded that "the
principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not
prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal
tribunal or court." '238 In effect, the SCSL was an international criminal tribunal
exercising an international mandate over international crimes. The tribunal, being
international, therefore fell within one of the four exceptions that the ICJ had
identified.239 As a consequence, although no longer a president entitled to ratione
personae immunity after having left office, Taylor's official status as a sitting
president when the criminal proceedings were initiated was not a bar to his
prosecution. 240 His case was, therefore, properly within the SCSL's jurisdiction.24
229. ld. 58,61.
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The Court notably failed to properly account for the germane issue of Liberia's third
party status to the bilateral treaty that had created the SCSL.
When Taylor eventually appeared before the SCSL, during his arraignment on
April 3, 2006, he again raised the question of his immunity. 242 He stated that he did
not recognize the court's jurisdiction since he believed his status entitled him to
immunity.2 43  Judge Richard Lussick reminded Taylor that he had previously
contested that issue and lost.24" As far as the judge was concerned, the matter had
been "thrashed out" by the Appeals Chamber.2 45 But Taylor was free to file motions
to revisit the issue after first pleading to the charges, which he thereafter did.
24 6
Interestingly, the defendant never again asserted immunity, even during the appeal
of his conviction. It seemed as if he realized that any further attempt to assert
immunity would not lead to a different outcome for his case. So he essentially gave
up the fight.
247
B. The Debate about Where to Try Taylor
After his arrest and arraignment, at the seat of the SCSL in Freetown, yet
another controversy arose in the Taylor case related to the venue of his trial.2 48 All
the other SCSL suspects were tried in the Sierra Leonean capital.249 But, even before
his initial appearance, Taylor knew that his case would be different. This was
confirmed when it was rumored that he would likely be transferred to The Hague.
For that reason, on the very first day that he appeared before the SCSL, Taylor
expressed preference to be tried in Sierra Leone.250 Taylor noted particular concern
about his fair trial rights and ability to obtain witnesses.2 ' The proximity of the
Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest Warrant Case Continued, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 645, 651 (2005); contra
James L. Miglin, From Immunity to Impunity: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16
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AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 325-339 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014). See generally Annie Gell,
Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE
SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 642-
62 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014) (providing a post-trial completion analysis).
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SCSL to his home country, Liberia, where he had most of his family, was also
naturally important to him.
252
In fact, the day after Taylor's arrival in Freetown, the President of the SCSL
submitted requests to the Netherlands and the ICC to facilitate the relocation of the
trial to The Hague.2 53 At that point, the ICC had an empty courtroom without any
defendants. Under the SCSL Statute and Rules, the SCSL could sit outside Sierra
Leone whenever this would be necessary for the exercise of its functions.2 5 4 The
Dutch government immediately agreed to host the trial, provided certain conditions
could be fulfilled.2 55 This included acceptance by another state to host Taylor in the
event he was convicted. 256 The ICC, after carrying out internal consultations and
notifying its states' parties, none of which objected to the idea, also consented to the
use of its facilities. 257 A delay of several weeks then followed when no African or
other country volunteered to detain a convicted Taylor until the British government
offered to do so on June 15, 2006.258
While the security rationale offered for moving the trial seemed to have merit,
there was considerable pushback from it, especially from within the human rights
community in Sierra Leone and the United States. Matters were not helped by the
government appearing to contradict the SCSL position. Key officials, including the
vice president who had been Sierra Leone's minister of justice and attorney general
during the establishment of the tribunal, Solomon Berewa, stated publicly. that he
did not think security was an issue.259 But, he changed his mind just days later.260
It was unclear what motivated the new stance. It has been suggested that maybe
there was new information suggesting such threats were credible. 26 ' The more likely
scenario might have been that the decision had already been taken outside of Sierra
Leone, perhaps in Washington, which enjoys considerable influence driving the
official policies of Monrovia and the United Nations.
The views of the Liberian government, which was not a party to the SCSL
process as such, were also relevant, though complicated. On the one hand, the newly
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elected President Sirleaf was concerned about security, given that Taylor retained
some domestic political support in the country.262 On the other hand, his prosecution
at the SCSL was not her priority. 263 The business of governing Liberia was more
important than the fate of a single Liberian who happened to be a former enemy.
Yet, to rebuild Liberia, she needed foreign aid from friendly governments, especially
the United States. In the end, the compromise was that President Johnson Sirleaf
would request that Nigeria transfer Taylor to the SCSL. 21 She was unequivocal
that, for security reasons, she preferred he not be tried next door in Sierra Leone.
265
For the SCSL prosecution, whose work would have been considered a failure by
many in Sierra Leone and overseas if it did not get to try its number one suspect, the
movement of the key case to another venue seemed like a price worth paying in
exchange for Liberia's request for his arrest and transfer into its custody.266
At the U.N. Security Council, urgent consultations followed Taylor's arrest and
arraignment at the SCSL in order to resolve the conditions that the Dutch
government had imposed before it would accept the trial. In Security Council
Resolution 1688, which paved the way for Taylor's transfer to The Hague, the
Security Council determined that Taylor could not be tried in the West Africa
"subregion due to the security implications. ' 267 The decision also determined that
Taylor's "continued presence" in the sub-region was "an impediment to stability and
a threat to the peace of Liberia and of Sierra Leone and to international peace and
security. ' ' 268 It further noted that it was "not feasible for the trial of former President
Taylor to be hosted at the premises of the [ICTR] due to its full engagement on the
completion strategy. ' '269 This implied that some consideration was given to the idea
of trying Taylor somewhere else in Africa. Yet, the actual extent of that evaluation
is largely unknown.
We can accept that, under prevailing international law, the Security Council
does-and more normatively, should-enjoy wide discretion to make
determinations of what constitute threats to international peace and security. All the
more so because, as the ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed in the Tadic case, the
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U.N. body is often faced with fluid situations.270 It is thus generally better placed to
determine, as a political and legal matter under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
what amounts to threats or breaches to the peace and security of the world. 271 And,
equally importantly, it is better placed to determine what forcible and non-forcible
measures to take to redress such security concerns.272 That is, in many ways, the
essence of its mandate.
Nonetheless, the Security Council's determination that sending Taylor to the
ICTR or another African State was not feasible seems somewhat contestable. The
ICTR reportedly was quickly consulted.273 It replied to the Secretary-General that
it was engaged upon its completion strategy. 274 It is unclear whether further reasons
were given or whether further consultations took place. However, the fact that the
completion plan was in place did not mean that the SCSL needed to encumber the
ICTR in any significant way for the purposes of carrying out its single Taylor trial
in Arusha, or more to the point, that alternative arrangements could not have been
made for another trial venue in Tanzania. It is also unclear whether the Security
Council considered other African States, including those in west, east or even central
Africa, for the purpose of hosting the trial and whether it sought AU support for the
idea of an in continent trial. Working with the United Nations, one might have
expected that the SCSL could have more easily made arrangements for the Taylor
trial in an African country with closer proximity to Freetown. Even more
importantly, especially for a tribunal operating on donations and the goodwill of
states, the cost of such an undertaking would have also been cheaper for the SCSL
than the financial burden that later resulted from use of the ICC facilities.
In any event, based on what the public knows, a critical look at the security
rationale for moving the Taylor case casts serious doubt on its veracity. For one
thing, the SCSL had in its custody other personalities who enjoyed more popular
support in Sierra Leone.275 Yet, none of them were transferred out of Sierra Leone.
If anything, the threats from the supporters of Sankoh, the erstwhile leader of the
RUF who eventually died in custody, were probably greater than that of Taylor, at
least to Sierra Leoneans.276 Thousands of former RUF combatants, including
notorious commanders, roamed the streets of Freetown freely. Similarly, Norman,
the deputy minister, was seen as a national hero for leading the CDF against the
RUF.277 He too was detained at the SCSL facilities in Freetown.2 78 Although it is
true that after his arrest, the tribunal did briefly explore the prospect of transferring
270. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
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him to the ICTR for security considerations,279 in the end, he was kept in the same
place of detention as Taylor and the rest of the other Sierra Leoneans. There were
no serious security incidents from troublemaker supporters. Yet, with Taylor, on
June 20, 2006, despite civil society's and his own attempt to forestall that decision
in the hope of remaining in Freetown, he was secretly transferred to The Hague.
280
Finally, without oversimplifying the matter, the SCSL was ensconced in a
"heavily fortified" compound with twenty-four hour security provided by hundreds
of seasoned U.N. peacekeepers. 281 Among the visible security was a high barbed-
wire fence, video surveillance equipment, metal detectors, guard posts with armed
soldiers, and even an armored personnel carrier. 282 On top of that, only a stone's
throw away from the SCSL building in New England were two of Sierra Leone's
largest army bases: Wilberforce and Murray Town Barracks. They too could
provide security backup. In other words, I am skeptical that-for all its significance
for Sierra Leoneans-less drastic measures than transferring Taylor out of Sierra
Leone were fully explored and first exhausted by the SCSL and the U.N. Security
Council before Taylor was sent to The Hague. Criminal justice, whether at the
national or international levels, aspires to give victims a measure of justice. That
justice is obviously better served and more likely better received, as the U.N.
Secretary-General has concluded in a review of best practices, if those victims get a
chance to see their alleged number one tormentor face justice. To the extent that
criminal trials bring closure, witnessing justice first hand is more likely to bring such
closure to the victims and their families.
On the other hand, to be fair to the SCSL, it is plausible that it had intelligence
through governments giving credible warnings about security threats that followed
Taylor's arrest and incarceration in Freetown. But, if any such a thing existed, the
information was never made public. Indeed, even as many Sierra Leonean
parliamentarians and civil society rallied against Taylor's transfer outside the
country, the SCSL failed to mount a robust effort to justify or explain the decision
to move the trial to the Netherlands. The lack of transparency exacerbated the
suspicions of the real motive behind the move, which was to get the defendant into
its custody without necessarily worrying about where he would be tried. In the end,
although there would have been some who breathed easier after the trial was moved
outside West Africa, many Sierra Leoneans were left frustrated with the decision to
take Taylor to Europe.283 It is unfortunate that, especially when combined with the
general lack of accessibility of his trial, the people in Sierra Leone and Liberia who
279. Id.
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were more likely to have been sobered by the lesson of seeing Taylor in the dock
were cheated of that opportunity. In short, to have maximized the impact of the
historic trial, the proceedings should have been held locally. This after all was said
to be a core advantage of the SCSL, sitting in the locus criminis, over its sister ICTY
and the ICTR-both of which had been criticized for their geographic distance to
the communities in whose names they were asked to render credible justice.
As a former SCSL and Sierra Leonean prosecutor Abdul Tejan-Cole has rightly
argued, the choice to move Taylor's case to Europe served not only to highlight the
complex politics involved in high profile mass atrocity cases, but also to blur the
line between the legal and political.284 Another Sierra Leonean lawyer, Alpha Sesay,
was even more critical. He suggested that transferring the trial of the star accused
outside the country undermined the "whole reason for having the Court in Sierra
Leone in the first place,"28 5 and in particular, deprived his alleged victims "of the
justice that they deserve." 2 I share in these views of my compatriots.
Other negative impacts of the change of venue of the Taylor trial can be
discerned. These include the manifold increase in the cost of the trial for the SCSL,
the complications that arose in dealing with witnesses who had to travel outside of
West Africa to testify, and the confusion and disagreements between the SCSL and
the ICC over who had responsibility for Taylor's conditions of detention. Many
additional controversies arose, including whether a video camera should record his
confidential meetings with his lawyers,287 whether he was entitled to family visits
paid by the SCSL,288 whether he was entitled to culturally appropriate African
instead of Dutch food alien to his Liberian palate,289 whether he should receive
conjugal visits from his wife,29 and so on. On top of all these, once the ICC had its
own cases, the SCSL was asked to move out.291 This forced the SCSL to relocate
mid-trial to the premises of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, where the case was
completed.292 These challenges added yet more avoidable delays and controversies
to the trial.
284. See Tejan-Cole, supra note 79, at 219-20.
285. Alpha Sesay, Liberia: Trying Charles Taylor: Victims' Justice Cannot Be Fully Achieved At
the Hague, ALLAFRICA (Apr. 19, 2006), http://allafrica.com/stories/200604190306.html.
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287. Katy Glassboro, 'Turf War' Over Charles Taylor Case, 104 ACR 2 (2007), available at
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/turf-war-over-charles-taylor-case.
288. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 -PT, Public Defence Application
Requesting Review of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the International Criminal Court and
the Special Court of Sierra Leone Dated 13 April 2006 & Modification of Mr. Charles Taylor's
Conditions of Detention, 3624 (Dec. 14, 2006).
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2007, 1:06 PM), https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/croatian-news/g5Dz9bgYYsk.
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VI. THE CONTROVERSIES AT THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE CHARLES TAYLOR
TRIAL
Both the opening and closing of the Taylor trial were highly dramatic affairs.
While the first was a result of a strategy that the accused had devised with his
provisional defense counsel, Karim Khan, the second can be attributed to his defense
team which failed to turn in the final trial brief when it was due. The latter situation,
which will be considered after discussion of the first, was then compounded by a
short-sighted decision of the majority of Trial Chamber II to reject Taylor's final
brief. This caused a disruption requiring the Appeals Chamber to intervene before
deliberations on his guilt or innocence could begin. The final dramatic scene, as the
curtain was drawn on the case, came from an even more surprising quarter: a judge.
A. The Dramatic Courtroom Walkout and the Ensuing Delay
Monday, June 4, 2007, was supposed to be the big day for the prosecution. All
openings of major trials are. It is typically a day for the prosecution to outline the
barebones of its case against the defendant, sometimes with great rhetorical flourish,
more for public than judicial consumption. The defendant and his lawyer generally
sit in the courtroom and listen to the allegations without much interruption, save for
exceptional circumstances. They would later get their turn to set out the defense
case, and commensurately, would enjoy the same courtesy. But, in the kind of
dramatic twist that came to characterize each stage of the Taylor case, when the
matter of Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor was called around 10:30 a.m. that
morning in ICC Courtroom I in The Hague, Khan gave a bombshell of an
explanation for his client's absence from the courtroom: Taylor was not coming to
court, and even worse, had no plans to return.29 3  Instead, in a letter Khan
passionately read out to the court, Taylor explained that he had been denied equality
of arms with the prosecution as well as adequate time and facilities to prepare his
defense as well as ability to consult the Court's Principal Defender, Vincent
Nmehielle. 94 As he believed he would not receive a fair trial, he would henceforth
not participate in a sham process. 95 He also fired Mr. Khan in favor of representing
himself personally.296
The problem for the judges was that Taylor was not in court. This meant that
barring proceeding without him or his being dragged into the courtroom, as the
prosecution suggested, the opening could not proceed. Instead of ordering that
Taylor be forced to court, which would have caused a problematic spectacle of a
defendant bound and gagged, the trial chamber sensibly responded with an order
293. See Transcript of Record at 242, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T (Jun. 4, 2007),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/-raylor/4June2007.pdf; see also David Pallister & Chris
McGreal, Taylor Boycotts War Crimes Trial, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.con/world/2007/ un/04/westafrica.libya.
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assigning Mr. Khan to represent the defendant.297 But he insisted that it would be
unethical for him to do so, even after he was threatened with contempt of court, as
this would mean that he had been forced upon the defendant who no longer wanted
his legal representation.298 Khan claimed that he was barred by both the SCSL code
of conduct for defense counsel and the rules of his national bar from accepting the
appointment once his services had been terminated by his client.299 The presiding
judge was not deterred, countering that "your Code of Conduct cannot override a
court order which I made a few minutes ago."3 ' The judge asked Mr. Khan to sit
down. She then invited the prosecution to continue with its opening statement, and
at that point, Taylor's defense counsel dramatically picked up his materials and
walked out of the courtroom.30 1 It was at that stage, consistent with SCSL and other
ad hoc tribunal practice that I was asked to take charge of the proceedings for the
duration of the opening statements and until replacement counsel was assigned.
30 2
The SCSL's American chief prosecutor, Stephen Rapp, then read out his
opening statement.30 3 I did not make any objections. After the prosecution opening
concluded, the chamber adjourned the proceedings, but not before inquiring into and
ordering that all of Taylor's complaints be swiftly addressed by the SCSL Registrar
and the Defense Office. 30 4 The latter prepared an internal report setting out its
independent views of the merits of the defendant's concerns, which then formed the
basis for resolution of the thorny issues. Taylor's risky gamble, which had been
largely forced by the short sighted decisions of the then SCSL Acting Registrar who
had failed to heed the Defense Office's warnings, had paid off.
In short order, by early August 2007, the Defense Office-which had now been
allocated more money for the Taylor Defense team-had found and assigned new
defense counsel for Mr. Taylor.3" 5 It was the kind of handsomely paid defense team
that the public defender's office had always internally insisted that Taylor needed to
receive a fair trial.306 All the more so given the size and complexity of his case and
its geographic divorce from the seat of the SCSL in Freetown and the locus commissi
delicti. Led by Courtenay Griffiths, an unassuming but "silver-tongued" British
Queen's Counsel with a baritone voice, the team would later prove its mettle
vigorously testing the prosecution case in the courtroom. Ironically, the new defense
297. Pallister & McGreal, supra note 293.
298. Richard J. Wilson, 'Emaciated' Defense or a Trend to Independence and Equality of Arms in
Internationalized Criminal Tribunals?, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF, no. 2 (2008), at 2, available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1014&context-hrbrief.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Jason McClurg, New Defense Counsel Appointedfor Charles Taylor, INT'L ENFORCEMENT
LAW REPORTER (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Clippings/2007/2007-08/pc2007-8-
24.pdf. See also Wilson, supra note 298.
302. McClurg, supra note 301.
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304. Wilson, supra note 298. See Transcript of Record at 242, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T
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305. McClurg, supra note 301.
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team-unlike the previous provisional counsel-was given several months to study
the thousands of pages of disclosure and to prepare for the cross examination of
prosecution witnesses. 30 7 With Taylor's goals to have a top notch defense team, and
adequate time for them to prepare having being achieved, I convinced the suspect to
end his boycott and return to court to participate in his trial. It was a big moment
for the SCSL trial of Taylor. The prosecution held press conferences, painting
Taylor's actions as those of the devious manipulator that he was. But, once he got
what he wanted, this claim was effectively repudiated. Taylor did not engage in any
of the antics or contumacious behavior we have witnessed in other high profile
international criminal tribunal cases like Milogevi"3 °8 at the ICTY. The trial was
adjourned for a few months. This experience suggests the need to keep an open
mind when fair trial complaints are raised by defendants as there will be times, such
as in Taylor, when these concerns have validity and are not aimed at manipulating
the process for political gain.
B. Of Flirtatious Warlords, Super Models, and "Dirty Looking" Stones
In early January 2008, the Taylor case resumed.30 9 The prosecution called its
first of ninety-four witnesses. 310 Ninety-one of those witnesses were so-called crime
base or linkage witnesses, while three were experts.3"' A key highlight to the trial,
at least for the Western media, which had largely ignored the oral evidence phase of
the Taylor case up to that point, was the intrigue surrounding the testimony of British
supermodel Naomi Campbell and American Hollywood star Mia Farrow. An
apparently fearful Campbell testified about receiving rough "dirty-looking stones"
or "pebbles" from an unknown person-a reference to the diamonds that Taylor
gifted to Campbell after "mildly flirting" with her at a dinner hosted in Pretoria by
then South African President, Nelson Mandela, on September 26, 1997.312 Besides
the viva voce witnesses, nearly eight hundred prosecution exhibits were admitted
307. Eric Witte, Court Delays Taylor Trial until January 7, 2008, INT'L JUSTICE MONITOR (Aug.
20, 2007), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2007/08/court-delays-taylor-trial-unti1-january-7-2008/.
308. For references by the Tribunal of Milogevi6 misusing hearings and cross-examinations as a
platform for making political speeches, see Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Initial
Appearance (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case
No. IT-02-54-T, Status Conference (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 2001);
Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Open Session (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Hearing (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Pre-Defense Conference (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 17, 2004). See Charles C. Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword
Mean Dying by the Sword?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 707, 707-53 (2013) (discussing the issues of disruption
that arose in that case and several others in international criminal law and the implications of the rights
of defendants).
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310. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR BY THE SIERRA COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE JUDGMENT 4 (Open Society Justice Initiative ed., 2012).
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into evidence, five of which were expert reports.313 The crux of the prosecution case
took just over a year, closing finally on February 27, 2009. 3
For its part, the defense case opened on July 13, 2009.311 Twenty-one witnesses
were called. 316 Taylor, in remarkably lengthy testimony, spent over seven months
on the stand between July 14, 2009 and February 18, 2010. 3 17 It seems highly
uncertain that giving such testimony was a wise decision. Not to be outdone by the
prosecution, the defense tendered about 740 exhibits, bringing to over 1,500 the
documents and photographs relating to Taylor's case.318 In a trial that in fact lasted
a total of 420 days, over the course of four calendar years, closing arguments were
finally heard in February and March of 201 31 9 By that point, the trial chamber had
issued nearly three hundred decisions on interlocutory matters.
320
Though the two last incidents that punctuated the end of Taylor's trial did not
match the kind of high drama that characterized the opening of his case on June 4,
2007, when Taylor refused to attend proceedings and his assigned counsel walked
out of the courtroom, they were dramatic nevertheless. In the first of these, the
responsibility lay with defense lawyers, not their client. They finalized the closing
brief and filed it about two weeks later than the chamber had specified. 321 As a
result, two of the three trial chamber judges rejected the brief, holding that the
defense counsel had forfeited its chance to have the chamber use the brief during its
deliberations.3 22  In stark contrast, in a lucid dissenting opinion, Judge Julia
Sebutinde found that the interests of justice and demands of a fair trial for Taylor
mandated that the chamber accept his brief even if it was late and contravened an
earlier order made by the judges. 323 She offered compelling arguments which turned
on the substantive right of the accused to a fair trial to support her dissent, pointing
out that a procedural irregularity such as a late filing of a brief by an accused person's
counsel is insufficient to displace the fundamental fair trial rights he was guaranteed
under the Statute of the SCSL.
3 24
313. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-l-T, Judgment Summary, 11 5 (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/Iibrary/report/2012/charles-taylor-judgement-
summary_20120426.pdf.
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Of course, on one level, the argument could be made that such a position
encourages defense lawyers to flout court orders. At the same time, the other side
of the issue is to consider the weight of failure to comply with this particular order
for the defendant. Certainly, as officers of the court, the majority court could have
chosen to show their approbation by sanctioning counsel by withholding fees, fining
them, or reporting them to their national bars for failure to abide by its deadlines.
This might have been the better approach as it would also recognize that the interests
of the defendant were substantially different, in such an instance, from those of his
lawyers.
In any event, given the majority ruling, both Griffiths and Taylor refused to
come to court, with counsel stating that he would not participate in any "farcical" 325
closing arguments until the defense final brief was accepted.326 The Taylor defense
thereafter appealed the majority trial chamber decision.3"7 And, sure enough on
March 3, 2011, the Appeals Chamber unanimously overturned the erroneous
majority ruling.3 28 The appellate court found it only fair that the trial judges receive
the final brief alongside that of the prosecution.3 29 This was duly done. The final
defense oral arguments took place just days later.33° The chamber then retired for
deliberations until they scheduled the judgment day. That prompted a minor
controversy because the day happened to be the one before Sierra Leone's national
anniversary. 33' The defense unsuccessfully argued for a date change to avoid the
specter that a Taylor conviction would be perceived as a gift to Sierra Leoneans for
their national day celebrations. 3
32
On April 26, 2012, just over a year after the conclusion of the prosecution and
defense cases, the long awaited verdict in the Taylor case was issued. 333 Trial
Chamber II, sitting in The Hague and comprised of Judges Richard Lussick, Julia
Sebutinde, and Teresa Doherty, issued a unanimous judgment.33 4 As was widely
325. Transcript of Record at 49290, 49294-95, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T (Feb. 9, 2011),
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reported thereafter, the judges found Taylor guilty of five counts of crimes against
humanity, five counts of war crimes, and one count of other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.335 Most of the acts were perpetrated by the RUF
rebels acting in concert with mutinying elements of the Sierra Leone Army known
as the AFRC in the period between November 30, 1996 and January 18, 2002.336
Taylor was convicted as a secondary perpetrator (i.e. as a planner, aider and abettor)
of murder, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, acts of terrorism, pillage, outrages
upon personal dignity, violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being of
persons.337 He was also found guilty of conscripting or enlisting children under
fifteen years of age into the service of armed forces, or groups, and using them to
participate actively in hostilities. 338 In an interesting twist, the judges refused to use
JCE and the prosecution failed to prove Taylor's command responsibility-both
modes of liability that everyone had expected would be crucial to the outcome of the
case.
C. Dissension on the Bench: A Regular (Not) Alternate Judge?
But if the Trial Chamber was trying to avoid its significant conviction from
being overshadowed by doctrinal or other debates about the shifting JCE theories or
criminal participation that the prosecution advanced against Taylor from the
beginning through to the end of trial, this was not destined to be. On this occasion,
the seeds of the final trial drama came from within the judicial chamber itself. After
the presiding judge concluded delivery of the oral summary of the unanimous three-
judge verdict convicting Taylor, and as the judges were rising to leave the
courtroom, Alternate Judge Sow, who had been the fourth judge sitting on the case,
attempted to make a public statement that he called a "dissenting opinion." To him,
the prosecution evidence was insufficient to convict Taylor.3 39 He then insinuated
that a grave procedural irregularity had occurred in that the trial chamber reached its
guilty findings without serious deliberations. 34" The curtain was drawn. Judge
Sow's microphone was cut off, and in the subsequent published transcript of that
day's hearing, his statement was not included because the hearing was considered
closed.
This unfortunate incident immediately triggered another firestorm of
controversy among legal commentators. These turned largely on the propriety of
Sow's decision to make a statement, given the established norm of silence by
335. Id.; OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, BRIEFING PAPER: THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR BY
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alternate judges in international criminal courts. Of course, the SCSL Statute 34 1
provided for alternate judges and its rules mandated that reserve judges be present
for deliberations, but clarified that they "shall not be entitled to vote"' 342 on the
outcome of the trial. This makes sense because the alternate judge should be able to
step in at a moment's notice to ensure the continuity of a trial if, for whatever reason
such as grave illness, death or sudden mental infirmity, one of the three regular
judges were unable to continue sitting. 343 That, of course, was never the situation
during the Taylor case.
Some commentators, like William Schabas, seemed sympathetic to Sow's
decision to speak.31 Others, such as Michael Bohlander and I, faulted Sow for
speaking out.3 45 As I argued more fully elsewhere, Judge Sow was certainly entitled
to formulate his views on the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the prosecution evidence
against Taylor. He was probably also equally entitled to share those views with his
judicial colleagues during the chamber's private deliberations. But it was improper
to express those opinions in public, keeping in mind that the rules do not contemplate
a substantive role for him in determining whether Taylor was guilty or not guilty.
346
Indeed, given the various limitations imposed by the SCSL Statute and the Rules,
Sow's statement amounted to a public statement or comment. Unlike his contention,
his remarks did not assume the legal character of a "dissenting opinion"-at least as
that term is understood in international criminal courts.
Furthermore, and even worse, in addition to violating basic provisions of the
statute and rules, his statement was inappropriate because it threatened to undermine
public confidence in the fairness of the Taylor case and to tarnish the credibility of
the SCSL's process. 347 Of course, the argument could always be made in defense of
Alternate Judge Sow that he might have taken up the unusual role of a judicial
"whistleblower" because the regular judges engaged in highly irregular practice.
Say, for instance, that the chamber failed to comply with its own rules of procedure
by not engaging in meaningful deliberations on the accused's criminal culpability-
as required by the hierarchically superior SCSL Statute. This odd situation would
found a stronger claim to justify his far reaching public allegation. It might also
have been easier to accept this if he had provided concrete evidence that could be
independently verified by third parties. And, whatever the case, he would likely
have gained greater sympathy from independent observers for his unusual move if
341. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 12, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
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he had provided a reasoned opinion explaining his legal and factual conclusions
about the Taylor case. He did not, at least publicly.
Not surprisingly, although I was uncomfortable with information that later
emerged about aspects of the disciplinary process that was subsequently used to
declare Judge Sow unfit to sit as a judge, he seemed to have invited some sanction. 348
He later gave a media interview elucidating his views. But additional substance that
would have justified his decision to speak out still appeared lacking. 349 It was an
unfortunate end to his otherwise important service during the bulk of the historic
Taylor trial. He was rumored to be the only judge to not miss a single day of hearings
during a four-year period.
In any event, on May 30, 2012, the Trial Chamber (now sitting without Judge
Sow) sentenced Taylor to fifty years imprisonment.350 Both the prosecution and the
defense appealed. 351 The prosecution alleged four errors while the defendant raised
forty-five grounds. 35 2 The bulk of the prosecution appeal asserted that the trial
chamber should have, in addition to finding Taylor guilty of planning as well as
aiding and abetting, also convicted him for ordering and instigating the commission
of crimes in Sierra Leone. 353 They also contested the trial chamber ruling that
evidence regarding certain locations not mentioned in the indictment could be
admitted, and finally, sought an increase in his sentence from fifty to eighty years,
which in their view better reflected the gravity of his crimes and overall criminal
culpability. 354
The defense appeal raised numerous issues. These tended to center on the
chamber's evaluation of the evidence, some of is factual findings that the RUF/
AFRC operational strategy, which was known to Taylor and conceived with
substantial help by him, marked a deliberate terroristic campaign against Sierra
Leonean civilians.355 They also claimed that the chamber had misapplied the law of
individual criminal responsibility, that Taylor's fair trial rights were violated in the
entry of cumulative convictions, and further, that the trial judges erroneously used
improper aggravating factors such as his head of state status while ignoring
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Independent Commission to Address Alternate Judge Sow's Allegation in the Charles Taylor Case,
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favorable mitigating factors in arriving at his manifestly unreasonable sentence. 35 6
They also used some of Judge Sow's contentions to challenge the guilty verdict.
357
Finally, as with the other controversies that came to be associated with the pre-
trial and trial phases of his case, during the appeal phase, the delivery of the
judgment in the Taylor case in September 2013 was marked with some rancor-at
least among some international criminal lawyers-about the proper legal standard
for aiding and abetting as a mode of responsibility in international criminal law.
Other developments at the ICTY, especially in the Perigic358 case, had suggested
that aiding and abetting required that the accused person's contribution to the
commission of the crimes could be punished only if the abettor specifically directed
his assistance towards the commission of the offenses in issue.359 This was
significant for the Taylor case since, with the exception of his involvement in
planning a few incidents, his conviction turned primarily on the trial chamber
determination that he had aided and abetted the RUF's commission of crimes in
Sierra Leone.
In their judgment released in September 2013, the SCSL Appeals Chamber
denied nearly all the substantial defense appeals save for minor reversals of
convictions entered against Taylor regarding one or two locations in Kono in Sierra
Leone.36° They also rejected the Perigic articulation of the legal standard for aiding
and abetting liability, finding it inconsistent with customary international law.
36 1
Any practical assistance by an aider-abettor which had a substantial effect on the
commission of crimes will incur individual criminal responsibility. 362 Regarding the
sentence of fifty years, it was within the trial court's discretion to decline to factor
into mitigation Taylor's insincere expressions of remorse.3 63 Save for one exception,
they also rejected all the prosecution's appeal.364
Overall, taking the totality of the circumstances, including the gravity of
Taylor's conduct, the Appeals Chamber upheld his conviction and the sentence.
Within a few days afterwards, Taylor was transferred to the United Kingdom to serve
out his sentence. 365 Although under standard tribunal practice he would be eligible
for release after serving about one third of his sentence, at the age of seventy years
old when he was convicted, it is unlikely that Taylor will see the light of day outside
356. Id. at 63.
357. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor Case Report, supra note 354.
358. Prosecutor v. Momdilo Perii6, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228judgement.pdf.
359. Id. 1f 16.
360. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, 11 15 (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A- 1389.pdf.
361. Id. 11473-81.
362. ld.
363. Id. 111 689-96. See Kevin J. Heller, The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, II
J. OF INTL. CRIM. JUST. 835-855 (2013) (commenting on the Taylor sentence).
364. Id.
365. Liberia's Charles Taylor Transferred to UK, BBC (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24537834.
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HMS Falkland where he has been housed in a hospital for his own safety. Thus ends
the story of one of Africa's most notorious warlords.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has showed that Taylor's status as the only non-Sierra Leonean to
be tried by the SCSL, for acts he did not personally carryout in Sierra Leone, his
stature as a sitting head of state at the time of his indictment, the transfer of his trial
from Freetown to the Hague and his imprisonment in the United Kingdom were the
key reasons why the case will be remembered as particularly controversial. But, as
this article also showed, the Taylor case had a penchant for generating controversy-
sometimes because of mistakes made by tribunal officials or decisions made by the
accused and his counsel. Indeed, at each step of the three main stages of the trial
process before the SCSL-pre-trial, trial, and appeal-the case generated its own
legal and political controversies: whether in relation to the timing of his indictment
as possibly obstructing peace negotiations aimed at ending Liberia's devastating
civil war; or, whether as an incumbent head of state international law conferred
immunity from prosecution on him; or, whether he should be allowed to live in
Nigeria unmolested or to be tried in Freetown or The Hague. These controversies
often posed unprecedented political, legal and even diplomatic and other practical
challenges for the prosecution, the judges, and tribunal administrators. These types
of challenges, which occur at the intersection of international law and international
politics, should thus be expected to be part of the experience required in the
management of trials of other former heads of state or government in other
international criminal courts.
The Taylor case concluded about a year ago with the final appeals chamber
judgment issued in September 2013. It is still somewhat premature to definitively
assess the full impact of the trial for Sierra Leone and his native Liberia, all of which
are now enjoying relative serenity in the Mano River Basin of West Africa compared
to the tumultuous decade of the 1990s. Yet, as the dramatic last finale for the SCSL
which concluded his trial and then closed its doors in December 2013, the case was
a major milestone. Partly because nearly all the other SCSL indictments related to
suspects who were present in Sierra Leone, they were swiftly arrested and
transferred to the custody of the tribunal. Much like the other aspects of his trial,
when it came to Taylor, matters were markedly different. In fact, although the first
actual indictee of the SCSL with the case number 2003-001, he was the last person
to be tried by the SCSL. This was obviously not scripted. However, the coincidence
of the delayed arrest and trial after the Freetown cases had been completed gave the
effect of a crescendo to one of Beethoven's concertos. Here, finally, was the Sierra
Leone tribunal's most important case involving its most important accused.
From the prosecution's perspective, the conviction of Taylor was a success,
even if a somewhat qualified one.366 And, from the perspective of the defendant
366. William A. Schabas, Charles Taylor Judgment Suggests a More Modest Level of Participation
in the Sierra Leone Conflict, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2012/04/charles-taylor-judgment-suggests-more.html.
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who had insisted on his innocence, it was a major loss. For the judges, it was the
court's longest and most voluminous trial, with the most public spotlight and perhaps
even the most external and internal pressure to get things right. Yet, they shifted
through mountains of oral and documentary evidence and issued a reasoned opinion
that generally satisfied the requirements of a fair trial under the law. Interestingly,
the Taylor case was the only one in the SCSL where the bench was unanimous on
all issues-three judges at the trial as well as five in the appeals chamber; a total of
eight judges. There were no formal dissents, as there were in all the other AFRC,
RUF, and CDF cases.
Finally, in terms of wider significance, since World War II, there have been
several international tribunal prosecutions of former heads of state or government.
At Nuremberg, German Admiral-turned-head of state Karl Doenitz who stepped in
to replace Adolf Hitler after his suicide was prosecuted. In the ICTY, former
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milogevi6, was tried but died of illness before his
judgment could be rendered. At the ICTR, Rwandese politician Jean Kambanda,
who was prime minister during the genocide, pled guilty to orchestrating genocide
and crimes against humanity at the ICTR on May 1, 1998. At the ICC, former
President Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast) will soon be on trial while Sudan's
President Al Bashir remains at large, despite an indictment containing genocide and
crimes against humanity charges against him. Viewed against this backdrop, the
historic nature of Taylor being the first former president since Nuremberg to have
been indicted, to contest the charges, and to be fully tried and then convicted before
an international criminal court becomes self-evident. If nothing else, the case
affirms that when there is political will, no immunity will attach to a current or
former president when he is tried before an international court for international
crimes. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor may thus go down in history as a
sizeable drop in the anti-impunity bucket, whose ripples will be felt by future African
warlords and rebel leaders as well as many other heads of state or government further
afield. The implications of Taylor are certainly clear for the leaders of States that
are in the habit of aiding and abetting rebels and providing arms, ammunition and
other logistics to rebel groups for personal, political, economic or other gains.
Although not free of difficulty, given all the legal and political controversies that
surrounded it, the trial may even prove to be a giant step towards the idea that no
man or woman-no matter how powerful-is above the reach of international
criminal law. At least sometimes. 367
367. 1 say sometimes both to signal the lack of accountability for others from more powerful states
which are undermining the presumed neutrality and thus legitimacy of modem international criminal law,
but also to clarify that even within the context of Sierra Leone and Liberia, impunity seems to have
prevailed for the crimes in Liberia. For the thoughtful suggestion that it might have been better to take a
more regional instead of country specific approach to transitional justice in both Sierra Leone and Liberia,
see Matiangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach to Transitional Justice? Examining the Special Courtfor Sierra
Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, 21 FL. J. OF INT'L. L. 2 (2009).
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